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Abstract
The purpose of this research was to determine the efficacy of the International
Monetary Fund’s Stabilization Program (IMFSP) as a tool for economic development.
The Fund’s program utilizes an approach steeped in the Washington Conesus, which
requires austere and demand side economic measures to be taken to achieve success. To
determine efficacy, Jamaica was used as a case study, where special attention paid to the
supply side economic consideration of human capital development in Health and
Education. Additionally, this paper contrasted the IMF approach with a case study of
Singapore and the Developmentalist approach to economic development. The research
provided a clear picture that the IMFSP did stabilize the Jamaica economy. However, it
did so at the expense of stunting human capital development in Jamaica. Therefore, a
different approach is required to bring lasting economic development.
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Chapter One: Introduction
After the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the 1970s, the global economic
system fell into turmoil. The shuttering of the gold window meant the world was now tied
to a fiat currency and therefore currency valuations were now unmoored from an
ultimately tangible anchor. The economic powers were forced to seek a new program to
stabilize currency valuations relative to each other so that stabilization of international
trade could be attained. A little over a decade later the Washington Consensus (WC) was
formed, and the western world entered a period of stable macroeconomics, low inflation,
and low unemployment. This period came to be known as the Great Moderation (GM).
From the mid-1980s, and leading to the Great Recession (GR), prominent economists
believed that the business cycle was mastered, and indeed, it appeared to be so. The
policies from the WC were believed to be universal principles that should be applied
equally across all nations. This thought process bled into the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), an organization that seeks to stabilize countries and assist with economic
development, through its policy prescriptions via conditional loans to developing nations.
Approximately two decades after the great moderation began, the global
economic system was, once again, rocked by a rather large shock. This new shock came
in the form of a housing bubble burst which cascaded into major firms failing and taking
the economy with it. This new period was aptly named the Great Recession. The GR
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challenged the notion that the business cycle had been mastered. Additionally, it called
the efficacy of the WC’s policies into question. Of the questions that arose from the GR,
the one of greatest interest to this paper is regarding the efficacy IMF’s stabilization
program, which is steeped in the WC style policies. The goal is to understand what kind
of effect, whether positive or negative, these policies, such as inflation targeting,
austerity, short term debt restricting, etc. have on developing nations.
The thesis is the IMF stabilization programs (IMFSP) do not provide a necessary
policy framework from which to build a solid enough foundation for sustained long term
growth. To accurately assess the thesis regarding the efficacy of the IMFSP, a country
study was performed of Jamaica. Jamaica is a perfect focus for this study due to its long
history of IMFSP utilization. The country gained independence from the UK in the 1960s
and has had several failed IMFSPs during the 1970s and 80s. Jamaica also applied for a
new IMFSP in 2008, right as the global economy collapsed, which gives it perfect timing
for review. Therefore, this paper seeks to test its long-term efficacy by not only
examining the long-term results in Jamaica, under this regime, but also by contrasting the
demand side theory with competing ideologies which also focus on supply side
considerations.
This paper will be broken down into three sections, followed by a discussion of
the findings. The first section, found in chapter two, will first explain the background and
development of the IMF itself. Its history of creating and policy determinations are
integral to understanding the how and why of the IMF. The second half of the chapter
will look at both the history of Jamaica and its history with the IMF. This is important to
understand both the culture of the country, as well as the policies and outcomes tried
2

prior to the GR. This will help anchor the research to compare how the IMF has changed,
if at all, post GR. Next, chapter 3 will provide a contrast to the IMF’s policies by
examining a prominent alternative theory to economic development. As part of this
examination a brief case study of Singapore’s use of the developmentalism approach is
provided. In chapter 4, the analysis will return its focus to Jamaica by looking at the two
most critical components of human capital: Health and Education. Both health and
education are vital to long term economic growth in a country as it takes a healthy and
educated workforce to move forward on a stable and consistent path. The paper will then
end in chapter 5 with a brief discussion of the information reviewed. The goal is to
determine if the IMF is on the right path to guide these vulnerable developing countries
out of crises and onto sustained growth and development. If not, what suggestions can be
provided to bring about success of the nations under IMFSPs?
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Chapter Two: The International Monetary Fund: A brief
history

When well developed countries fall into economic trouble, they have a depth of
resources to pull from. The resources not only allow these countries to fix trouble areas
through economic, monetary, or fiscal reforms, but also provide what is needed for the
next economic crisis. Conversely, less developed countries (LDC) do not enjoy this
luxury. They may be able to enact economic, fiscal, or monetary reforms, but without a
depth of resources to pull from, the wherewithal to weather the storm is lacking.
Fortunately, solutions do exist for this very situation as LDCs may turn to international
organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB), Inter
Development Bank (IDB), or the New Development Bank (NDB) for grants, loans, and
other financial assistance in addition to economic policy assistance and implementation.
The purpose of this chapter is to look specifically at the rise of the main actor in
international developmental assistance, the IMF, and its relationship to a long-standing
recipient, Jamaica. The goal is to provide a brief overview of its creation, look at its
policy changes over time, and provide a basic understanding of its current approach to
economic assistance. Next, the chapter will turn towards Jamaica and its long relationship
with Jamaica. To wit, the focus will be the time period of 2008 through present.
4

History of IMF Creation:
To understand the IMF’s current policies, it is important to look at how and why
the IMF was created. During the time the IMF was created the world was undergoing a
massive paradigm shift in its approach to globalized finance. Prior to creation, the world
was recovering from the first World War, a difficult interwar economic period, and the
dawn of a new reality as the Second World War drew to a close. The previous paradigm
considered a gold backed currency as necessary for stabilization. With this, the issues of
capital flight, hot money, and arbitrage arose from each country independently seeking a
parity between their own currency and gold. Specifically, coordination was required to
allow the individual monetary systems to keep at parity with gold and to allow for unified
global success. This new system came about from the Bretton Woods agreement. This
system allowed for much needed capital controls, which “were designed to avert the
threat posed by volatile capital flows” (Eichengreen, 2008, 92). Lastly, the plan needed a
system in place to monitor and correct imbalances. From this need the IMF and WB were
born, with the former set to provide short term intervention and the latter to provide for
long term needs and development planning.
According to Barry Eichengreen, the IMF “was created to monitor national
economic policies and extend balance of payment financing to countries at risk” (2008,
page 91). Specifically, “The IMF was founded to address the problems created by
disorderly and unstable exchange rates in the 1930s and to discourage exchange rate
policies that might injure national economies and disrupt the operation of the
international system” (Eichengreen and Woods 2015, 35). Or as Nishikawa (2015)
5

explains, “The Fund was supposed to encourage its members to restore current account
convertibility, giving them short-term finance that facilitated a conflict caused by the
concurrent pursuit of full employment and balance of payments equilibrium” (Kazuhiko
et al. 2015, 49). Therefore, the initial strategy of the IMF was to address short term issues
with current account convertibility by becoming a lender of last resort. The mechanism of
short-term financing prevented illiquidity while allowing the peg to flex and return the
currency to parody and therefore bring the current account back to neutral. It is important
to note, this mechanism was available only to those who wanted it. The IMF did not have
a mechanism to enforce changes in the current account of a country. As Ghosh and
Qureshi (2017) explain, “the IMF had significantly fewer resources than Keynes wanted,
surplus countries would face no penalty for failing to adjust” (Ghosh and Qureshi 2017,
8).
Eventually, there was a breakdown in the Bretton Woods system, which caused its
collapse. According to Ghosh and Qureshi (2017), “the fundamental coordination—
surplus countries agreeing to revalue their currencies and the United States pursuing
tighter monetary and fiscal policies—was lacking which is what ultimately led to the
demise of the system” (Ghosh and Qureshi 2017, 15). In other words, Bretton Woods set
up a monitoring system but not a policing system. The IMF could see the structural issues
but could not force countries to make the changes needed to guard the system.

6

History of Policy changes:
Creation-1980:
The Bretton Woods agreement gave the IMF the basic framework and laid out the
Articles of Agreement for the IMF and its member countries. The agreements, as Piet
Clement (2015) explains, “relied on a combination of automaticity and supranational
controls (“multilateral surveillance”). IMF members were expected to respect certain
ground rules – currency convertibility, non-discrimination – and not to adopt any
domestic policies that would contradict them” (Yago et al. 2015, 68). To reiterate, the
purpose of this tool was to provide a system for coordination and adjustment. The goal
being to bring stability to international trade through assisting in current account deficits
and with convertibility issues.
At its inception, the IMF was given the charge of lending to stabilize a country
and therefore has always had stabilization at its core. To this end, the IMF has employed
two major tools since its early days. The first is that of short-term conditional financing to
address current account issues, known as Stabilization Programs (SP). The second is the
Stand-By-Agreement (SBA), which were created in 1952 and is also predicated on prenegotiated conditions. According to J. Keith Horsefield (1969), “when introducing or
pursuing a stabilization program a country often feels the need to reinforce its reserves,
not necessarily for immediate disbursement but as a precaution against pressure on the
balance of payments. It was to meet such needs that the Fund's stand-by arrangements
were devised” (Horsefield 1969, 475). In other words, SBAs provide a safety net should
the current account need further assistance later, provided the pre-negotiated
7

conditionality is adhered to. It should be noted that Stabilization programs and Stand-By
Agreements are not interchangeable terms. The two are separate programs, though they
often are attached to one another (Horsefield 1969, 475).
In addition to the typically used SP and SBA, there is a third, and rarely used, tool
that called Strategic Drawing Rights (SDR). Ghosh and Qureshi (2017) explain, “Bretton
Woods was predicated on the dollar being ‘as good as gold’… and thus the generation of
reserves by the United States meant that its stock of external liabilities increased, which
undermined confidence in the system” (Ghosh and Qureshi 2017, 11). Therefore, the IMF
needed to find a tool to provide liquidity independent of other countries’ reserves. The
IMF, according to Ghosh and Qureshi (2017), addressed this dilemma in 1969 through
the creation of the SDR. The SDR is
An artificial reserve asset that harkened back to Keynes’s bancor. By
allocating SDRs to member countries (in proportion to quota), the IMF
could create additional global liquidity independently of US (or any other
country’s) deficits. To date, however, there have been only three general
allocations (Ghosh and Qureshi 2017, 11-12).
In 1971, when US President Nixon closed the gold window, and thereby ending
dollar convertibility, a major change to the global economic system occurred. Not only
did this signal the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, but also that of the gold
standard and the system’s resultant coordinated currency pegs. “For the IMF, the collapse
of Bretton Woods presented an existential crisis: it seemed hard to justify an institution
whose very raison d’être—the Bretton Woods system—had ceased to exist” (Ghosh and
Qureshi 2017, 15). This crisis of identity was short lived as the IMF was relied upon in
the wake of the collapse. Specifically, the global financial system was shifting from
pegged currency rates to that of managed floating currency rates. The IMF’s role was to
8

provide stability during the turbulent transition. Ultimately, the system failed as the IMF
did not have the capacity to support the system. As Yago et al (2015) explain,
The direct cause of its failure was the fact that the assumption in the IMF
guidelines that fluctuations in exchange rates caused by speculative factors
could be offset for the most part through intervention by currency
authorities was undermined by the actual scale of the turbulence in
movements of short-term capital (Yago et al. 2015, 317).
This failure paved the way for a new philosophical approach to global finance and what
role the IMF should play in terms of stabilization.
In the late 1970s the IMF board had a series of meetings to define the path
forward for the IMF. As Ghosh and Qureshi (2017) explain
the IMF Board—identified two key goals for the reformed international
monetary system: ’achievement of symmetry in the obligations of all
countries debtors and creditors alike,’ and ‘the better management of global
liquidity’… the IMF’s Articles of Agreement were amended to legitimize
floating exchange rates (Ghosh and Qureshi 2017, 13-14).
Eichengreen and Woods (2015) put a finer point on this paradigm shift,
Where the original Article IV had alluded to a system of stable exchange
rates, the 1977 decision referred instead to a stable system of exchange
rates. This minor change had major consequences: it reoriented surveillance
from the stability of exchange rates to the stability of the ‘system’—and, by
implication, to the policies influencing that stability (Eichengreen and
Woods 2015, 32).
Therefore, they further, the SPs and SBAs “were extended not merely to help a
government defend the particular level of the exchange rate, but to enable it to take
various steps needed to maintain economic and financial stability” (Eichengreen and
Woods 2015, 39). Also, as Colin Bullock (1986) explains, “IMF adjustment policies
focus on both demand management and the attainment of ‘appropriate economy-wide
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prices’” (Bullock 131, 1986). Therefore, the paradigm is quite different from the original
approach.
The shift in paradigm from rate stability to economic stability was only part of the
IMF’s change. As Carmen M. Reinhart and Christoph Trebesch (2016) explain, “the
number of IMF lending programs more than doubled from 1976 to 1983. The new wave
of IMF clients was comprised mostly of LDCs. This marked shift in the composition of
types of countries borrowing from the IMF influenced the modalities and scope of the
programs” (Reinhart and Trebesch 2016, 10). This further shift in paradigm affected the
policies and approach of the IMF. There were two notable policy changes during the
decade that followed. The first of these changes looked to address debt issues. The
second change sought provide affordable financing while structurally adjusting. Both of
which are explored in the next section.

1980-Present
The first real change to stabilization and restructuring took root in the mid-1980s.
In reference to the Mexicans suspension of debt-service payments in 1982, Peter B.
Kenen (1990) explains “This was the birth of the case-by-case approach to the debt
problem. It was predicated implicitly on the belief that debtors faced a short-term
problem arising from an unusual combination of worldwide recession and high interest
rates brought on by a shift in the policy stance of the major industrial countries” (Kenen
1990, 7). Kenen furthers that in 1985
the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, James Baker, proposed a three-part
"program for sustained growth" to deal with the debt problem…Austerity
10

would fight inflation and produce the trade surpluses needed by the debtors
to make their debt-service payments. Structural reforms and new lending
would generate the growth needed to reduce the burden of those payments
(Kenen 1990, 8).
Also, as Colin Bullock (1986) explains,
It must be emphasized that a ‘viable payments position’ does not necessarily
refer to a current account surplus but may mean a current account deficit
which is financed by ‘sustainable’ net capital inflows ‘that are compatible
with the development and growth prospects of the country, and, therefore,
with its debt carrying capacity’ IMF adjustment (Bullock 131, 1986).
This mindset explains why lending had to be on a case-by-case basis.
By the late 1980s, it was clear that the Baker plan did not adequately address the
debt issue. As Kenen (1990) explains,
Secretary Baker came back to the banks in 1987, to ask that they develop a
"menu" of new instruments and methods to step up their lending. But the
whole debt strategy began to change in 1988… the seven major industrial
countries had agreed to grant debt relief to low-income countries, mainly
in Africa, but had pointedly excluded middle-income debtors (Kenen
1990, 8).
This new landscape brought about a new focus to reduce debt, but the IMF needed a
method to achieve this. Kenen explains that U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Baker doubled
down on his menu approach to lending, however the focus “was shifted from raising to
reducing debt: a late but fundamental change in the official interpretation of the debt
problem” (Kenen 1990, 8). Next, in 1989, the new U.S. Secretary of Treasury Nicholas
Brady took the Baker plan further, and in ways we still recognize today. Specifically,
Brady called “for a three-year waiver of clauses in existing loan agreements that stand in
the way of debt reduction… and called on the IMF and World Bank to use some of their
policy-based lending to aid the debt-reducing process” (Kenen 1990, 8). It is important to
note that the Brady plan proposed that the IMF use its resources “to collateralize debt-for11

bond exchanges at significant discounts and replenish reserves following cash buybacks
of debt, and some could be used to underwrite the interest payments on new or modified
debt contracts” (Kenen 1990, 8-9). As will be illustrated later, these policy
recommendations are still in use today. According to Reinhart and Trebesch (2016),
In 1987, the IMF introduced the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility
(ESAF) program, which focused on making low-interest loans to lowincome countries… One main step was the external debt restructurings in
16 countries (mostly in Latin America) under the Brady Plan of 1989, in
which creditors agreed to write down the debts they were owed in exchange
for being issued new debt that was more likely to be repaid. (Reinhart and
Trebesch 2016, 10).
Above, the ideology behind the debt approach is explained. The ESAF was part of the
implementation of the approach as financing would still be needed, but it would be
needed with less burdensome terms.
As explained earlier, the IMF plans for structural assistance (SP, SBA, ESAF)
requires adherence to a conditional economic plan. According to Colin Bullock (1986),
“IMF financing to a country experiencing balance of payments problems especially under
Stand-By and Extended Fund Facility agreements is, therefore, conditional upon the
borrowing country undertaking certain policy adjustments” (Bullock 1986, 131). In terms
of understanding the ideology that drives these policies, he explains “the focus on
appropriate economy-wide prices has its roots in the emphasis of the neoclassical
tradition on the superiority of markets in the efficient allocation of resources” (Bullock
1986, 132). In modern vernacular, since the 1980s these plans fell under the policy
recommendations of the Washington Consensus during a period known as the Great
Moderation (GM). The GM was a period of “significant decline in macroeconomic
volatility that began in the mid-1980s” (Hakkio 2013). That is, lower inflation and
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unemployment in the Western hemisphere. Additionally, the Washington Consensus was
a ten-point ideology that the legislative body in the United States of America could agree
on, hence the name Washington (as in Washington D.C.) Consensus. John Williamson
(2004), the author of the Washington Consensus, lists the ten points of the consensus as
(Williamson 2004, 3-4):
1. Fiscal Discipline
2. Reordering Public Expenditure Priorities
3. Tax Reform
4. Liberalizing Interest Rates
5. A Competitive Exchange Rate
6. Trade Liberalization
7. Liberalization of Inward Foreign Direct Investment
8. Privatization
9. Deregulation
10. Property Rights
With the rise of the WC came an ideology shift in the approach to policy
recommendations by the IMF. Specifically, “In the 1960s and 1970s, fiscal and monetary
policy had roughly equal billing, often seen as two instruments to achieve two targets—
internal and external balance, for example. In the past two decades [1990-2010],
however, fiscal policy took a backseat to monetary policy” (Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia, and
Mauro 2010, 3). In result, the IMF policies recommendations coalesced around the tools
of monetary policy. Prior to the Great Recession the IMF’s approach to developing
conditional economic policies centered around targeting inflation. All other aspects of the
economy mattered only in the respect that the overall picture was one of economic health
and stability. Olivier Blanchard, who served as the Chief Economist of the IMF from
September 2008 – September 2015, explains:
we thought of monetary policy as having one target, inflation, and one
instrument, the policy rate. So long as inflation was stable, the output gap
13

was likely to be small and stable and monetary policy did its job. We
thought of fiscal policy as playing a secondary role, with political
constraints sharply limiting its de facto usefulness. And we thought of
financial regulation as mostly outside the macroeconomic policy
framework… Stable and low inflation was presented as the primary, if not
exclusive, mandate of central banks. This was the result of a coincidence
between the reputational need of central bankers to focus on inflation rather
than activity (and their desire, at the start of the period, to decrease inflation
from the high levels of the 1970s) and the intellectual support for inflation
targeting provided by the New Keynesian model. In the benchmark version
of that model, constant inflation is indeed the optimal policy, delivering a
zero output gap. (Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia, and Mauro 2010, 3).
In terms of economic policy, the GM was concerned with one thing, and one thing
only: inflation. The GM saw a target inflation rate as the best measure for economic
stability. In result, monetary policy took the driver’s seat and fiscal policy became
ancillary. It is important to note that, though Monetary policy took center stage in the
IMFSPs, fiscal policy was not entirely left out. However, Blanchard et al (2010) further,
the IMF, through the lens of the GM, had two concerns with fiscal policy. First, it is
much more dependent upon the whims of politicians, which often renders fiscal policy
ineffectual or fickle. Second, because it is political in nature, fiscal policy tends to have
rather large lags in development and implementation. As a direct result to these
assumptions, the IMF primarily focused its fiscal policy recommendations on debt
sustainability (Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia, and Mauro 2010, 9).
Since the Great Recession, the IMF has come to realize that their policies should
have a broader scope. The largest change in the policy recommendations is with fiscal
policy. No longer relegated to the back seat, fiscal policy now takes a more aggressive
counter cyclical stance. Though, there is caution to this end as high levels of indebtedness
and high levels of unfunded liabilities does greatly reduce the space in which fiscal
14

policies have to operate, that is it creates de facto constraints on fiscal budgets. As
Blanchard et al (2010) explain:
It has also shown the importance of having “fiscal space” (and here there is
a parallel with the earlier discussion about inflation and room to decrease
nominal interest rates). Some advanced economies that entered the crisis
with high levels of debt and large unfunded liabilities have had limited
ability to use fiscal policy (Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia, and Mauro 2010, 9).
In summation, when a country enters a recession with high debt and or unfunded
liabilities, they do not possess the resource to enact fiscal policy stimulus. Instead, the
result is typically increased austerity and taxation. In result, the recession will deepen as
aggregate demand further decreases from reduction in wages through the increased taxes.

Jamaica and the IMF
Today Jamaica is the largest English-speaking country in the Caribbean.
However, this was not always the case. Jamaica was first discovered on May 5, 1494, by
Christopher Columbus’ second voyage to the “Indies.” The island was then used by Spain
as a supply base for the Spanish’s colonization effort of Mainland America. On May 10,
1655, Spain officially relinquished Jamaica to England. The English saw Jamaica not as a
supply hub, but as an agricultural gold mine. The most profitable of these crops was
sugar. Before long most agricultural endeavors gave way to sugar plantations. With the
rise of farms also came the rise of slave trade. Jamaica soon developed the nickname the
middle passage, as it served as England’s mid-point in trade as they picked up slaves in
Africa, sold them in Jamaica for residents of the entire Caribbean, and then picked up
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goods to sell back in England. The slave trade lasted until 1808, when it was officially
abolished by the English parliament, and emancipation was granted to all slaves in 1838.
After approximately 300 years, Jamaica’s reliance on agriculture final began to
give way in the 1950’s. It was at this point Jamaica started to develop strong tourism and
bauxite mining sectors. Of the latter, by the 1960’s Jamaica was the second largest
producer of bauxite globally. The 1960s saw great change in Jamaica as they were able to
gain independence from England on August 6, 1962. Before gaining independence in
1962, Jamaica had already moved its economy from near entirely agricultural to a
mixture of tourism, agriculture, and bauxite mining, with mining the largest of the three
sectors. With post war economies doing well with reconstruction, Jamaica was in a great
spot to enjoy success. At this point the global economy was doing well, and Jamaica
benefited from the rapid expansion in manufacturing as that increased demand for
bauxite, the raw ore input for aluminum. However, the success of bauxite proved to be a
double edge sword as they soon found they were overexposed in this sector. Specifically,
the oil shocks of 1973 changed the global economic landscape which, in turn, reduced the
global demand for bauxite. Without bauxite trade and without the English government to
back it financially, Jamaica found itself in need of its first of many stabilization loans
from the IMF.
The Jamaica Observer pointed out,
The pursuit of a strong socialist agenda … in the face of significant
economic challenges during that decade, brought notable but economically
unsustainable social advances which created fiscal imbalances and forced
the country into a very tough borrowing experience with the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1977 which was to persist well into the 1990s
(Dennis 2014).
16

To clarify, the expansionary fiscal policies pursued were unsustainable in the face of a
recession, and a rather large one at that. The result of the one-two punch of unsustainable
policy and recession led Jamaica into their first IMF loan. As tables 1 and 2 below
highlight, Jamaica began an agreement in 1973 and had to draw from the IMF near yearly
from 1977 to 1992.
Table 1: Jamaica’s IMF arrangements with amounts drawn by year.
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Table 2: Jamaica’s IMF loans and repayment amounts by year.

When the IMF agreement began in 1977 the Jamaican economy was struggling,
as figure 1 below will illustrate. The oil shock was extreme, and it illustrates Jamaica’s
over reliance on one good, especially when compared to simpler countries in its region.
When the IMF stepped in Jamaica was struggling to find its ground. As the graph shows,
they did manage to find footing in the mid-1980s. As to why, this will be covered in
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section two. Suffice it to say the literature points to the growth happening in spite of, not
due to, the IMF involvement.
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Figure 1: GDP Growth (%) of Jamaica Vs Region 1970 - 1993
Tables 1 and 2 show two major IMF plans. The first starting in 1977 and the
second in 2010. The need for the new plan grew out of the Great Recession as the
Jamaica economy saw a decline in its major industries. The specifics of which will be
detailed in section two. In terms of analysis, the latest IMFSP to Jamaica comes at a great
time. The negotiations for the program began in 2008 when the Great Recession was just
hitting its stride. The plan officially began in 2010, which is around the time the IMF
realized a different approach was needed to address stabilization in the modern era.
Therefore, what is currently seen in Jamaica is the changing of philosophy from one of
the GM to one which encompasses greater fiscal policy.
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Pre-Great Recession (1962 through 2008)
In 1962, Jamaica gained independence from the British Monarchy. With their
independence they gained control over their economic and fiscal policy decisions as well
as the need for self-reliance as they were no longer going to receive assistance from
England. During the period between their independence and the great recession,
Jamaica’s financial position became such that it would require dependence on IMFSPs.
The obvious question is what caused Jamaica to be in a place where it needed
stabilization assistance from the IMF? Specifically, there are two questions that need to
be addressed. The first, what caused the need for IMF stabilization? The second, did the
IMF assistance help or hinder? Thankfully, there is relevant literature that elucidates the
economic policies and climate which precipitated the need for IMF stabilization.
Furthermore, the literature critiques both the IMF and Jamaica for the successes and
failures during this period.
There are a few of concerns with a colony gaining independence that must be
addressed. These concerns are not obvious, but the effect of which is strongly felt.
Bissessar (2014) elucidates that gaining independence from a colonizer is a complicated
affair. Specifically, she collates the research to explain that it “suggest that these
countries were ‘conditioned’ to be both economically as well as psychologically
dependent on the larger countries even as they attained independence” (Bissessar 2014,
190). This fact is present in Jamaica, where, for over 300 years prior to independence,
they relied on England to provide economic stability. Jamaica’s economy fit into the
larger scheme of the United Kingdom’s (UK) economic plan. Therefore, the country
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could prosper on having a single output, as their economy was a facet of a larger
economy, much like an individual state in America still enjoys economic success when
the United States of America does well. The granting of independence complicated this
as the safety net of the UK was gone, as well as Jamaica’s ability to rely on one product
and still prosper. In other words, Jamaica now needed to stand on its own as an economic
whole instead of just a part.
Fortunately, by the time Jamaica gained its independence it had successfully
diversified by adding mining and tourism sectors to its established agriculture sector. The
shift in economic output was needed, but history repeated itself as Jamaica went from a
primary reliance on agriculture to that of mining. This inability to fully diversify caused
Jamaica’s eventual economic problems as illustrated by the strong recession in the wake
of the fall of demand for bauxite in the 1970s. To illustrate, Bullock (1986) explains
“Despite the surface manifestations of economic health, Jamaica, in the 1960s, ran
current account (Balance of Payment) deficits which were financed by net capital
inflows, especially for expansion in tourism and bauxite/alumina” (Bullock, 1986, 139).
Essentially, the 1960’s saw a global period of economic boom which financed Jamaica’s
shortfall, thereby hiding the root issues of single product reliance. Therefore, when the
exogenous global economic shock of the 1970’s occurred the issues with Jamaica’s
economic policies came to light.
Bissessar (2014) also notes another point of concern is “that during this period,
the manufacturing, financial, and almost all the large companies remained under foreign
control” (Bissessar 2014, 191). This is an issue for the economy because foreign control
causes capital to leak from the domestic economy. Specifically, majority of profits made
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are repatriated to the country of ownership. Likewise, high paying jobs, especially
executive jobs, are reserved for the foreign country as well, thus leaving only low wage
positions for domestic labor. The capital leak creates downstream issues in two ways.
First, the economy is stunted as standards of living do not increase at hoped for rates
when the higher paying jobs are not for domestic labor. Second, fiscal revenues are
lessened as well. At the time Jamaica needed the revenues the most, it lacked the
“revenue to establish much needed infrastructure, including roads, bridges, sewer, potable
water supply, health and other services” (Bissessar 2014, 191). With these concerns in
mind, it is now understandable why Jamaica needed IMF assistance so close to gaining
their independence.
During the 1960s, just a few months after gaining independence, Jamaica saw first
signs of trouble which causing it to enter into a SBA. However, this agreement was not
utilized as the newly independent Jamaica wanted to remain beholden to itself only.
Therefore, Jamaica took drastic measures to keep their economy running as they thought
it should. During this time, the People’s National Party (PNP) came to power in 1972,
under the leadership of Michael Manley, with the express goal to lead Jamaica into a time
of Democratic Socialism. Bissessar (2014) explains that Jamaica created a plan, to be
implemented in 1972 through 1980, to nationalize its major industries. These industries
included Bauxite mining, tourism, agriculture, and utilities. At this time, Jamaica also
implemented the following policy measures:


Wide-ranging price and trade controls [the primary focus was to develop
national industries. Therefore, high tariffs were placed on imports that could
be sourced domestically. Likewise, prices were fixed on other goods to
encourage consumption of local products.]
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Increasing marginal taxes by 14%, which gave a bracket range from 30% to
57%.
Expanding government spending through a rapidly increasing public sector
labor force.
Raising transfers to newly created state-owned enterprises, which included
bauxite, tourism, and agricultural sectors. Specifically, Bissessar (2014)
explains “the Government of Jamaica owned eight out of twelve sugar
factories, producing 75% of the sugar input of the country and 50% of the
room capacity in the hotel industry” (Bissessar 2014, 192).

Jamaica’s socialist build up happened to occur as oil shocks shook the world and caused
high inflation and economic contraction. The shocks brought to fore the problems with
Jamaica’s policies as under them “manufacturing and mining contracted and agriculture
stagnated, government services grew significantly” (Bullock 1986, 139). In other words,
the contraction left Jamaica unable to support its newly nationalized industries.
Therefore, when the IMF was consulted, their recommendations called for Jamaica to
reverse much of what the PNP had accomplished under Manley. As Bullock (1986)
explained, the economic policy recommendations from the IMF revolve around having
reasonable prices and a stable exchange rate, which the PNP was unable to accomplish
through their policies.
Policies for government spending often operate like a pendulum. When there are
tax revenues to spend, the size of government grows both in type and level of service.
However, this often leads to insufficient funds and deficit spending, which can become
an issue. McBain (1990) explains deficit spending can create a structural problem as it
leads to larger levels of internal and external debt. Specifically, she states “The debt
burden [both internal (via government issued debt securities) and external (via loans from
various entities such as the IMF)] resulting from the policy is now a major constraint on
government's ability to provide social services and undertake infrastructural investment”
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(McBain 1990, 205). This is evident in Jamaica as the level of indebtedness, which is
expressed as a ratio of total government expenditure to Gross Domestic Product (GDP),
which rose from 0% in 1962 to over 50% by the 1990s. Furthermore, McBain’s (1990)
research explains “The growth of the public sector has therefore become a constraint on
growth and development in an economy where production, productivity and exports have
declined and imports have increased to satisfy demand” (McBain 1990, 207). As seen in
the case of Jamaica, the high level of deficit spending did have visibly negative impacts
on the government’s ability to manage and stabilize the economy.
McBain’s (1990) research also identified two issues preventing contraction of
government spending without an exogenous pressure. First, she found that governments
tend to grow spending year over year, regardless of economic cycles, that is irrespective
to boom and bust cycles. Second, she found that governments typically buy votes with
expansionary policy leading up to an election, then need to undertake measures
afterwards to curb the inflation brought on through these policies. This creates an
unhealthy cycle. As part of this cycle, she also explains that fiscal and monetary policy
often do not align. Specifically, “Monetary policy of high interest rates to reduce
consumption and to increase saving has therefore conflicted with fiscal policy to
encourage increased investment which requires low interest rate” (McBain 1990, 203).
These conflicting policies further add pressure to the economy as the conflicted signals
add confusion to the markets.
One consideration to address in Jamaica’s development is inflation. In the case of
Jamaica, by the 1970s the rate of inflation was growing quickly. Most of this inflation
was caused by external factors such as growing commodity prices in oil (that is the oil
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shocks in the 1971-72), corn, and fertilizer. There was also a reduction in the price of
sugar, which was a large export for Jamaica and 75% of production was nationalized, and
the fall in demand for bauxite (Bissessar 2014, 193). However, there were also internal
mechanisms responsible for inflation. Specifically, Jamaica had implemented a series of
policies which caused inflation as an unintended consequence. For example, Jamaica
implemented price controls on many goods, which caused retailers to hoard inventory
until prices were raised. Also, it implemented import controls, i.e. import substitution,
that prevented the importation of goods that could be sourced domestically, thereby
disrupting the comparative advantage mechanisms in supply and demand. Additionally,
Jamaica nationalized many of its industries such as tourism and sugar production.
Therefore, slowdowns in these industries hit the government harder than it would have
had they been privately owned. To clarify, Jamaica was still responsible for paying wages
and fixed costs of nationalized industries versus simply receiving less tax revenue had
they been privatized. Lastly, Jamaica pegged their currency to the British Pound, which
caused a drop in foreign investment when the Pound weakened. These forces worked
together to raise inflation in Jamaica, as is shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Jamaican Inflation Rate by % 1963 - 2000
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In terms of Jamaican policy, the research by Kwon, McFarlane, and Robinson
(2009) found:
There is a signiﬁcant risk of a debt-inﬂation trap in highly indebted
countries. A rise in inﬂation expectations will eventually push up nominal
interest rates, elevating public debt unless fully countered by a primary
surplus. The debt increase will in turn raise inﬂation expectations further.
This vicious feedback effect implies that rising inﬂation expectations could
increase budgetary costs more than proportionally (Kwon, McFarlane, and
Robinson 2009, 503).
This feedback loop was magnified in Jamaica because of an unwillingness to take steps to
curb inflation. Jamaica had promised to implement disinflationary policies, but never
followed through. Investors saw this as a signal to limit exposure which prevented the
economy from moving forward with the expected pace. Specifically, the IMF agreed to
provide loans to Jamaica if it “undertook large currency devaluation, instituted a wage
freeze, and made a greater effort to balance the budget” (Bissessar 2014, 194). Jamaica
initially agreed to these terms, but after receiving payment reneged on the policy
implementation. Instead, Jamaica created its own plan to devaluate their currency and
focus on agriculture and self-reliance. However, this was enough for Jamaica to reenter
negotiations on further funds. Though, as Bissessar (2014) points out, Jamaica continued
this song and dance with the IMF. The result is that seven of the twelve agreements were
cancelled by the IMF as Jamaica’s half-hearted implementation led to missing various
performance targets specified by the plan.
It is also worth noting that Bullock (1986) points out “the Fund sees itself as a
specialist in stabilization and not in growth” (Bullock 1986, 135). Consequently, “its
diagnosis and treatment, in ignoring external factors, deal with only a subset of the
relevant problems. The Fund is seen as underplaying the role of exogenous shocks (for
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example, oil price increases) and other external factors including protectionism in
developed countries” (Bullock 1986, 137). Overall, Bullock explained the IMF’s reliance
on current account deficits has proven problematic for developing economies. This is
especially true for countries such as Jamaica, who have less developed markets.
It is also important to note that most critiques of IMFSP success do so without
addressing problems that arise out of implementation. In terms of Jamaica, the research
identified two areas where they did not follow through in properly implementing IMF
policies. The first area, as explained in McBain’s (1990) research, is the issue of buying
votes with fiscal and monetary policy. As explained earlier, buying votes leads to
unhealthy cycles of expansion and contraction of fiscal and monetary policies, which
cause economic instability. The second area is Jamaica’s inability to commit to IMFSP
policy implementation. In a paper by Handa and King (1997), it is shown that Jamaica
has implemented the IMF’s policies haphazardly at best. Likewise, Marston (1995)
illustrated that even when Jamaica did follow policies from the IMF, they are not
implemented completely. He explains, “the Jamaican response … to the resulting
monetary expansion [as prescribed by SBAs after 1987] has been in the main, to flip flop
between indirect and direct instruments of control. This ambivalence has proven to be
damaging to credibility and confidence” (Marston, 1995, p. 136). The lack of
consistency in policy implementation and follow through creates hesitation in both
business investments and direct foreign investments, which prevents economic
stabilization and growth. Therefore, the IMFSPs, prior to 2008, cannot be fully critiqued
as Jamaica did not follow through completely on required policy implementation.
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Post Great Recession (2008 to present)
In 2008, the global economy suffered a severe blow by the collapse of the United
States housing market and stock market crash. During this time major financial
institutions, such as Lehman Brothers, went bankrupt. This caused a severe ripple in the
global economy, the cascade which followed caused a global recession which is rivaled
only by that of the Great Depression. This recession was aptly named the Great
Recession (GR). As figures 3 and 4 illustrate, by the time the GR hit global markets
Jamaica had already been in steep decline. In 2006 a severe hurricane ravaged the island.
The result was a slowdown in tourism as hotels were damaged, a sharp reduction in
exports as agricultural crops were destroyed, and the mining sector began to slow in
demand. Therefore, when global consumption bottomed in 2009, Jamaica was not able
soften the economic blow and its recovery was slower compared to developed nations.
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Figure 3: GDP Growth (%) of Jamaica Vs USA and Euro Area 2000 - 2017
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Figure 4: Jamaican Inflation Rates 2000-2017
The post GR research shows Jamaica started the recession from a place of
unsustainable debt. In Johnston and Montecino’s (2011) work, Jamaica’s high level of
indebtedness is illustrated. Specifically, “Jamaica’s total debt to GDP ratio began to rise
again between 1996/97 and 2002/03, increasing from 71.3 percent to 124.7 percent. The
debt to GDP ratio decreased slightly during the following five years but began to grow
again with the onset of the current recession” (Johnson and Montecino 2011, 2). The
natural disaster of the 2006 hurricane and the GR coupled together stunted Jamaica’s
development.
Regarding the debt buildup, even though the external shocks form natural
disasters and global recession do result in higher debt, Jamaica’s debt gain has another
factor to consider. Johnston and Montecino (2011) explain,
it is important to stress that Jamaica’s large debt buildup is not the result of
profligate government spending. Indeed, Jamaica is a case where IMF
policies have focused on the narrow goal of fiscal consolidation, prioritizing
the interests of creditors over employment needs as well as the growth and
development of the Jamaican economy (Johnston and Montecino 2011, 2).
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It is important to note here that in the 1970s Jamaica did implement policies that caused
profligate government spending. However, this caused a radical shift in the 1980s that not
only reversed the policies, but, with the assistance of the IMF, also put Jamaica on a
hopeful path to sustainability. Though, Johnston and Montecino (2011) are implying the
IMF’s help puts a country on longer term instability as every time a country received a
loan from the IMF it added to their debt, and more importantly, their debt service.
A secondary issue of the IMF loans is that they forced Jamaica into permanent
policy changes. As Johnston and Montecino (2011) explain, “the near doubling of the
public debt that took place between 1996/97 and 2002/03 was the result of government
interventions during Jamaica’s financial crisis” a crisis which was promulgated by the
IMF requirement, in the 1990s, for financial liberalization which encouraged “reckless
behavior by financial institutions that eventually led to widespread bankruptcies by 1994”
(Johnston and Montecino 2011, 5). Specifically, as Bissessar (2014) explains,
By 1991 . . . As part of the Structural Adjustment Package with the IMF,
the country undertook a rapid process of financial liberalization. The
government embarked on a process to eliminate and loosen long standing
credit restrictions and interest rate ceilings, a prescription leading to in a
rapid expansion of the financial sector. It was clear though that that whiles
the policy was introduced, something was obviously missing. Namely, the
accompanying regulation (Bissessar 2014, 197).
Unfortunately, the regulations lagged far enough behind the liberalization that room for
abuse was found. This resulted in the creation of the Financial Sector Adjustment
Company (FINSAC), whose job was to breakup, nationalize, and merge troubled
financial institutions. The remaining debt burden of these institutions were added to the
government’s growing debt.
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In terms of debt, the loans Jamaica engaged in with the IMF not only had a
significant impact on its external debt, but also on its budget. As Grigorian, Alleyne, and
Guerson (2012) explain, “Interest payments [on debt from IMF and government issued]
averaged 52 percent of fiscal revenues during FY2005/06–FY2008/09, making the
budget inflexible and leaving too few resources for addressing important social and
infrastructure needs” (Grigorian, Alleyne, and Guerson 2012, 3). Therefore, when
national disasters struck Jamaica, such as hurricanes and tropical storms, there were no
funds available to restore the island. This fact especially caused problems in one of
Jamaica’s largest industries, tourism. Additionally, “Heavy public debt service
obligations resulted in a large risk premium on interest rates, periodic bouts of financial
market instability, and a crowding out of bank credit to the private sector, all of which
had contributed to a very low potential growth rate” (Grigorian, Alleyne, and Guerson
2012, 3). With high public debt and a global recession, Jamaica had to once again
approach the IMF for assistance in 2009.
When Jamaica approached the IMF in 2009, the IMF was reluctant to help
Jamaica because of the high level of debt service. Therefore, as a preemptive measure,
Jamaica created a debt restructuring scheme aimed at lowering the current debt servicing
burden. Specifically, the plan entailed offering current Jamaican bond holders the
opportunity to swap high yield bonds near maturity for lower yield bonds with a longer
maturity date. The Jamaican government targeted approximately US$7.8 Billion worth of
bonds to restructure. Of these, both United States Dollar (USD) and Jamaican Dollar (JD)
denominated bonds were targeted. Prior to restructure, the average rate on the USD bonds
was 9% and the average for the JD bonds was 19%. After restructuring, the rates
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decreased to 7% and 12.5% respectively. Additionally, as seen the table below, bonds
that were exchanged had to be transferred into like securities. To clarify, fixed rate bonds
had to remain in fixed rates, variable rates could choose from fixed, variable or inflation
protected, and USD denominated bonds had to remain as such.

Figure 5: JDX Illustration
The tool created to accomplish the plan was the Jamaican Debt Exchange (JDX),
which launched in 2010. It is important to note, “the exchange was limited to domestic
debt and did not include a reduction of principal. Instead, the objective was to lower the
public debt burden by renegotiating its interest rate and maturity structure” (Johnston and
Montecino, 2011, 6). The JDX received 100% participation from Jamaican debt holders
and, in result, the “average maturity was lengthened from 5.3 to 8.7 years” (Johnston and
Montecino, 2011, 6). The success of the JDX was predicated on the investor perception
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of IMF involvement as it lent credibility to the exchange and signaled to investors that
Jamaica would not default on the debt but would instead honor its agreement.
Despite being a successful event and providing a reduction in the overall debt
service payments, the program did not provide what was ultimately needed. Grigorian,
Alleyne, and Guerson (2012) explain, “Despite its achievements, JDX arguably did not
directly address the debt overhang problem. The stock of debt and its structure continue
to pose risks for fiscal sustainability” (Grigorian, Alleyne, and Guerson 2012, 18).
However, the research does make it clear that debt exchanges are valuable tools as
investors prefer to lengthen repayment and lower interest rather than lose principle.
The JDX was Jamaica’s requirement to free up additional funding from the IMF.
Once completed, the IMF stepped in with their own policy recommendations. However,
there is room to question the efficacy of the IMF recommendations. Whereas the JDX
was a condition to secure IMF funding, the funding itself required “significant fiscal
consolidation, based on wage freezes, reduced expenditure and increased revenues. . . and
has committed to years of extremely austere fiscal policy” (Johnston, 2015, 2). For
example, Johnston (2015) explains one of the IMF requirements is to “run a primary
surplus of 7.5 percent of GDP… Greece, which is facing a tense standoff with the IMF
and European authorities, was only expected to run a primary surplus of 3.0 percent of
GDP …but this is widely considered politically unsustainable” (Johnston 2015, 7). In
order to achieve this surplus, the expectation is to cut budgetary expenditures in public
sector wages from 11.1% to 9%, capital from 4.2 to 1.8, and interest, viz a viz another
debt exchange, from 9.6 to 6.6. As for the wages, the plan is to shrink the size of the
public sector through attrition and divestment of public companies.
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Johnston (2015) also made several other poignant observations in his research.
First, under the newest IMF program “the Jamaican government actually paid the IMF
over $136 million more than it received in 2014” (Johnston 2015, 12). This fact
highlights the issue with loans in general. Specifically, taking a loan may fix the nearterm issue in capital, but it leaves the long-term issue of repayment. As the creation of
SBAs imply, the repayment often comes before stability is reached in the economy,
which causes budgetary issues for all other government expenditures. To this end,
Johnston suggests that debt forgiveness has a greater impact on stabilizing an economy
verses taking on loans which require repayment, some of which are unsustainable. He
also explains that the performance analysis competed by the IMF show false positivity in
outcomes. The reason is Jamaica has had a new inflow of direct foreign investment from
several countries, which would have occurred regardless of IMF assistance. For instance,
“China committed over $700 million in investments in 2013 alone,” which came from the
procurement of bauxite mines (Johnston 2015, 13). These direct investments obfuscate
the real impact of the extreme austerity by the IMF, thereby inflating the success of the
program. Johnston also observes, “While the latest IMF projections show Jamaica’s
economy reaching its 2007 level sometime in 2016, the economy will remain well below
its historical trend… Per-capita GDP, a better measure of average living standards, is not
projected to reach its 2007 level until 2019.” (Johnston 2015, 4). Therefore, Johnston
concludes that the IMF has missed the mark with their policies.
In comparing IMF policy prescriptions from the 1970s to that of 2009, McBain
(2014) explains: “the prescriptions were merely a rehash of the early prescriptions offered
by the IMF. Moreover, in hindsight, they were prescriptions that had failed to bring
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around any significant improvements” (McBain, 2014, 197). In other words, McBain’s
research confirms Johnston’s showing the policies implemented as failures. McBain
furthers,
Although Jamaica generally followed the terms of the agreement, inflation
soared, real wages fell, foreign reserves collapsed, and the trade deficit
rose… Indeed, this situation led a number of critics to question whether the
IMF really understood the challenges facing Jamaica since clearly their
prescriptions did not result in any improvements (McBain 2014, 194).
This last point is a serious question, does the IMF really take into consideration the
individual nature of each country they support? McBain implies that the IMF takes a
formulaic approach to development, and the approach might not be the best.
Ten years prior to McBain, Cashin (2004) rose a similar concern. He believed that
the IMF has missed the mark in understanding the Caribbean as a whole. In his IMF
working paper, he explains how the Caribbean business cycles differ from the IMF
assumptions. Specifically, he raises two questions. First, do developed and developing
nation business cycles differ from one another? Second, are business cycles broadly
similar across all developing nations, that is are all developed nations experiencing the
same business cycles at the same times or do they differ in timing and length? He asserts
that, in terms of misunderstanding or mischaracterizing developing nation business
cycles, “use of potentially inappropriate conclusions regarding the stylized facts of
macroeconomic fluctuations in developing countries can adversely affect the efficacy of
stabilization policy advice” (Cashin, 2004, p. 3). Cashin reaches several conclusions in
his research. First, he concludes that the length of each expansion and contraction cycle
are different between developed nations and that of the Caribbean. Second, if the
assumption of where the country is at in its business cycle is incorrect an ineffectual
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policy is implemented. Lastly, Cashin determined that the Caribbean operates on a cycle
that follows other industrialized nations, instead of one following other developing
nations. Though he does not explain why this is, there are several reasons why this may
be. First, in the case of Jamaica, there is a dependence on exporting raw inputs. For
example, the export of bauxite to nations heavily involved with industrial production,
thereby linking the two economies. Overall, Cashin’s work indicts the IMF’s use of
single austere policy approach.
Returning to Johnston’s (2015) work, there is one final concern the research
illustrates. Specifically, his concern is with the severity of the IMF’s required austerity in
its policy recommendations for Jamaica. Johnston (2015) explains “With little to no
growth and large cuts in public expenditure, Jamaica has seen a two-fold increase in
poverty since 2007” (Johnston 2015, 14). He furthers, “After cutting off new loans in
2012 following the breakdown of the first agreement with the IMF, Jamaica actually paid
more to its multilateral partners (IMF, IDB and World Bank) than it received for two
years” (Johnston 2015, 14). His suggested solution is to forego the extreme austerity.
Instead, “multilateral development banks should work with Jamaica and other creditors to
provide meaningful debt relief, freeing up needed resources to invest in the future of the
country” (Johnston 2015, 14). Johnston’s work does raise important questions regarding
austerity, spending, and successful paths to development. As seen in the juxtaposition
between the IMF policy recommendations and research like Johnston’s, the answers are
not clear but worth the effort to research.
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Discussion
This chapter had two main functions. The first was to highlight both how and why
the IMF was created as to understand the foundational policies and principals of the fund.
The second was to understand what the IMFSP looked like in real terms by reviewing its
history with the long-standing partner of Jamaica. While completing this review, it was
determined that though the IMF’s paradigm shifted significantly after Bretton Woods, the
application of the IMF tools maintained the underlying philosophy of stabilization.
Altogether, the IMF was created out of a desire to bring stability to the system through
coordination and safety nets. This ideology deeply engrained itself into the fabric of the
IMF Articles of Agreement, and therefore colored its policy creation and implementation.
The Bretton Woods system may have collapsed, but its legacy is still found in the IMF
approach today.
The first critique of the IMF has risen from those under current IMF programs.
These countries believe that the IMF has a poor track record of evaluating and
communicating the current state of the global economy as it relates to the member in
question. Eichengreen and Woods (2015) point out:
In response to such complaints, the IMF commissioned a survey and review
by its Independent Evaluation Office (2007), which concluded that the Fund
was ‘simply not as effective as it needs to be in both its analysis and advice,
and in its dialogue with member countries’ (Eichengreen and Woods 2015,
36).
Eichengreen and Woods (2015) further:
At times, the Fund has encouraged members to move toward more flexible,
market-determined rates, albeit with less than full success. At other times,
it has encouraged countries with rigid exchange rates to maintain them,
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lending to governments when their currencies were under pressure
(Eichengreen and Woods 2015, 35-36).
Therefore, there is credible room for disagreement with IMF findings and, by extension,
its approach.
The Second critique of the IMF is found in its approach. The issue is the IMF is
trying to complete two competing goals simultaneously. Specifically, the IMF was
founded to stabilize exchange rates, which is a short-term goal, and this later morphed
into stabilizing systems of exchange, which is a long-term goal. As will be demonstrated
in the following chapters, the IMFs can be shortsighted with stabilization and therefore
prevent long term success. In other words, the IMF’s policies may sacrifice long term
success in areas like education and healthcare to bolster current instability. This is done
through austere programs that focus on not only ending deficits but allow room for
repayment of IMF loans. As demonstrated earlier, fiscal space is important to recovery
during economic downturns. By prioritizing repayment in the current term, this may be
utilizing too much fiscal space, thereby preventing long term success.
In turning to the literature on the IMF and Jamaica, the articles reviewed on the
topic revealed great insight into the IMF efficacy while leaving key factors unaccounted.
One such area left unaccounted for is that of foreign ownership of domestic production.
This differs from foreign direct investment as it affects domestic capital differently.
McBain’s (2014) research explained that foreign government control over domestic
industries causes capital leakages. She explains this happens for two reasons. First, top
paying jobs go to foreign nations who repatriate their renumeration. Second, profits are
likewise repatriated, and therefore cause capital leakage in the domestic economy.
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Another area left unexplored is that of political climate in relationship to foreign
control of Jamaican industries. For example, one of the largest bauxite mining companies
in Jamaica is owned by a Russian company. During the annexation of Crimea, sanctions
were placed on Russia, which resulted in the closing of the mine in Jamaica and further
harm to the economy. Subsequent to the sanctions, and the resulting loss in revenues,
several of the Russian owned mines were sold off to Chinese firms. However, the United
States has now engaged in a trade war with China, which is causing fluctuations in the
Chinese economy. How this will affect Jamaica is still undetermined, but it could
potentially lead to another contraction in mining. The resulting whipsaw of the Jamaican
mining industry highlights a serious issue with foreign control over domestic assets. In
terms of the mining industry, Jamaica has not done anything to warrant reprisal but twice
has felt the downstream effects of US sanctions and tariffs. When developing
stabilization plans, there needs to be consideration of foreign control. Though issues like
the Russian sanctions, for example, cannot be predicted, acknowledgment of the
possibility is a must. Therefore, contingencies for industry failures must be added into
planning.
Along this vein, complex issues of GDP growth are not examined in any real
detail. For instance, one paper explained that foreign direct investment obfuscates data.
However, there is no research into the extent this is true, therefore more research is
required to understand both magnitude of obfuscation as well as to determine if the level
of development has any bearing on the magnitude. Likewise, only one article mentions
the effect of informal economies on the country. It is understandably difficult to quantify
informal economies, but their very real effects warrant further consideration from
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independent research and the IMF alike. Another point on GDP growth is Jamaica’s slow
adoption of IMF policy recommendations. As was demonstrated earlier, Jamaica often
agrees to a plan to receive the funds but fails to implement the required plan until such a
time as more funds are needed. To some extent this is caused by the politically untenable
policy recommendations from the IMF. However, there is more to this then that, but the
research does not delve into this.
A final point of contention on the literature is found in the categorization of the
economy. The Caribbean is categorized as a Latin American economy. This
categorization needs to be directly addressed as island nations have unique issues that
mainland countries do not face. For perspective, the island of Jamaica is approximately
the size of the county of Los Angeles, with two thirds the population of the city of Los
Angeles. Consequently, the Island does not have the space or resources to efficiently
cultivate for agriculture, mining, tourism, business, etc. Ergo, the issue is island
economies need to import most of the inputs to the products they export. This creates a
unique pressure on monetary policy as domestic currency must be strong enough for
importing raw inputs, but weak enough to be competitive with exporting their final
goods. Therefore, when adding pressure from high level debt service and outside policy
recommendations on monetary policy, especially when they ignore Jamaica’s unique
factors, the policies tend to mis the mark. To find how much, further research is required.
Altogether, when the IMF policies are reviewed, especially when looking at
practical applications like with Jamaica, a clear stylistic bent is seen. The IMF policies
very clearly favor demand side policies, such as fiscal constraints, tax rate changes,
interest rate changes, etc. However, these policies may have a negative effect on supply
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side considerations like healthcare and education. In the next chapter, an alternative
approach to development will be reviewed to illustrate the importance of addressing the
supply side considerations and how that could lead to greater demand.

41

Chapter Three: Mainstream and Alternative Developmental
Views

The previous chapter explored the policy prescriptions of the IMF and how they
have changed over time. Next, the IMF’s relationship with Jamaica was described to
bring the policy analysis into focus. What this exploration illustrates are the fruits of
traditional neo-classical economic theory steeped in WC ideology. This ideology takes a
generalized, one size fits all, approach which specifically targets supply side
considerations such as liberalization of trade through free trade agreements, currency
devaluations, fiscal austerity, and inflation targeting. There is no doubt that these policies
have demonstrated some level success where applied, otherwise they would have been
abandoned completely to the annals of history. However, it must be asked if this is the
only effective approach to development? This section seeks to address this question by
contrasting the supply side theory with competing ideologies which also focus on demand
side considerations, such as import substitution (IS) and government intervention in the
economy. Fortunately, a great example of this can be found on another island state:
Singapore.
It is important to note that Jamaica (like Singapore) faces similar developmental
challenges as a primary goods exporting country. In the literature, developmental
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challenges that primary goods exporting countries is articulated by the Prebisch-Singer
hypothesis (PSH). Harry Bloch and David Sapsford (2000) explain, “an elaborated
version of the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis posits a secular decline in the terms of trade of
primary producers in developing countries and points to the lack of competition in
manufacturing as compared with primary production as a contributing factor” (Bloch and
Sapsford 2000, 462). Therefore, the assumption used in creating and evaluating policy is
that primary commodity prices have secular downward trends. As Rabah Arezki,
Kaddour Hadri, and Prakash Loungani (2014) tested in a time series from 1650 to
present, “The results on the Prebisch–Singer hypothesis tests are mixed. However, the
majority of the piecewise regressions have downward slopes” (Arezki et al. 2014, 220).
This success of the PSH is thus acknowledged in both competing developmental theories
listed below. However, they differ in their approach to the issue.
To provide a contrast of alternative approaches for economic development, this
chapter will be broken into several subsets. The first subset will summarize supply side
economic policies. The second subset will summarize demand side economic policies.
Next, this chapter will shift its focus to the Singaporean experience, with special
consideration for its technocratic government intervention in the economy at large.

The Dominant View: Austerity, deregulation, and free trade

In the 1980s, supply side economics came into vogue to combat the competing
issues of high inflation and high unemployment. The idea was to tame inflation -even at
the expense of high unemployment rates- by means of monetary policy since fiscal policy
43

was seen to be one of the chief culprits according to the dominant monetarist ideology of
the time. To restore the economic order, supply side policies -such as tax breaks for
business were implemented with the hope that this would lead to higher levels of
investments which would create jobs, drive innovation, and thereby drive the economy
forward. At the heart of this theory laid the ideology that deregulation and liberalization
was necessary to success. This theory eventually percolated into the Washington
Consensus, which in turn filtered into developmental organizations such as the IMF and
WB. One philosophy to spring from this was export promotion (EP), which is an
ideology that encourages free trade agreements and competition.
In the previous chapter, the IMF policies addressed illustrated its desire to bring
austerity to government spending, liberalize markets, focus on EP, and reform taxes.
These policies, in a broader term, are defined by Mehdi Shafaeddin (1995):
They are the core of a more comprehensive set of structural adjustment
measures which have often been adopted in response to the conditional
finance available from multilateral financial institutions, in particular the
World Bank and IMF. They have generally involved neutralizing incentives
for exports and imports at low tariff levels through:
(i)
Removal of import quotas and other quantitative restriction or their
conversion into tariffs
(ii)
Subsequent reduction of the level and the dispersion of import tariff
rates
(iii)
Compensatory devaluation of the national currency
(iv)
Removal or reduction of export taxes
(Shafaeddin 1995, 2)
In reviewing and critiquing IMF policies, David Sapsford and Hans Singer explain:
Furthermore, since the policy prescriptions that both the Fund and the Bank
see as following from their acceptance of the Prebisch-Singer declining
trend hypothesis is basically to diversify (see, for example, Bankl, p. 20;
Wilson, 1994, pp. 350-351) there arises the possibility of the occurrence of
what might be seen as a second-order adding-up problem in the sense that
the alternative lines of activity which primary commodity dependent
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economies might be encouraged to move into in their attempt to diversify
away from falling real export prices (be they either different primary
commodities -with a niche market perhaps- or manufactured goods) may
themselves be subject to falling prices! (Sapsford and Singer 1998, 1655).
As Sapsford and Singer point out, developmental organizations realize the
validity of falling commodity prices as defined in the PSH. The approach then is to
liberalize trade and diversify products. However, they find that this, in and of itself, is not
enough as the diversified products are still subject to falling prices. Does this, then
invalidate the approach? Returning to Mehdi Shafaeddin (1995), it is shown that there is
a gradation of liberalization that determines the level of success. Specifically, in terms of
trade liberalization, he found:
in general, high and medium liberalizers tended to perform better than the
low liberalizers; they had positive GDP, MVA [Manufacture Value-Added]
and export growth, and a greater degree of production and export
diversification during the 1980s. However, the medium liberalizers
performed better than the high liberalizers in respect of all indicators
(Shafaeddin 1995, 4).
The finding points towards an alternative view to development that has promise to spur
sustained growth and development.

The Alternative View: Developmentalism
In the previous section, Shafaeddin pointed to the fact that there are different
approaches to trade liberalization that work better than full liberalization. He explains the
reason:
The orthodox recommendations on trade liberalization neglected the
importance of long-run development of supply capacity and the limitation
of market forces in building up such capacity… there is a growing
dissatisfaction with trade liberalisation and export-promotion policies …
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The failures of the rigid trade policies advocated by international
institutions such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and
World Trade Organisation are increasingly leading to the recognition that
premature and far-reaching liberalisation of trade may be problematical for
many LDCs (Subasat 2009, 13, 46).
It is important to note that this dissatisfaction is not a new phenomenon. The various
opposing economic models have grown out of these types of dissatisfactions. One such
model was revived in the wake of World War II, where there was a perceived failure of
coordination to the capitalist structure, thereby leading to the resurrection of
developmentalism.
Ha-Joon Chang (2014) explains, “unbeknownst to most people and rarely
mentioned even in books on the history of economic thought, there is a tradition in
economics that is even older than the Classical school” (Chang 2014, 102). The school of
thought he refers to is Developmentalism. Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira (2016) explains
developmentalism:
it defined industrialization as the main way to achieve economic
development, the foreign constraint as a main obstacle to it, and asked for
foreign savings; it drafted a concept of economic development as structural
change; it argued for an active role for the state; and, in the political realm,
it emphasized the role of a developmental class coalition bringing together
business industrialists, workers, and the public bureaucracy to build the
nation-state (Bresser-Pereira 2016, 336).
In modern parlance, developmentalism is a type of planned economy. Under this regime,
the state plays the leading role in economic planning. Ha-Joon Chang (2014) furthers that
developmentalism has no true forefathers “because policy-makers, who are interested in
solving real-world problems, rather than intellectual purity, started the tradition” (Chang
2014, 103). In section 3, Singapore will stand out as a strong example of practical
development through industrial policies to solve real-world problems.
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An important aspect of the developmental regime is the idea of industrial policy
for an economy. Under this type of planning, developing nations must engage in the
global economy and develop industries or technology they previously have not had.
Therefore, these nations must find ways to develop the advances while remaining
competitive in some way. Thankfully, there is a historical perspective that sheds light on
a way forward. Ha-Joon Chang (2003) explains “The historical picture is clear. When
they were trying to catch up with the frontier economies, the NDCs (now-developed
countries) used interventionist industrial, trade and technology policies in order to
promote their infant industries” (Chang 2003, 28). In a later work, Ha-Joon Chang (2014)
paraphrases an argument by Alexander Hamilton “the government of an economically
backward nation, such as the US, needs to protect and nurture ‘industries in their infancy’
against superior foreign competitors until they grow up; this is known as the infant
industry argument” (Chang 2014, 50). Therefore, under developmentalism, it is
reasonable and historically accurate to protect industry as it grows while pursuing
economic growth.
There are many tools to use to protect an infant industry. One of the most
prominent amongst developing nations is import substitution (IS). In essence, IS “aims to
replace previously imported commodities with domestic production and supply”
(Narjoko, Anas, Herdlyanto 2018, 74). Or, as Park and Hur explain, protecting
burgeoning domestic industries provides:
breathing space to grow up over time and become internationally
competitive…mechanisms for growing up over time include achieving
greater economies of scale and learning-by-doing. As such, central to the
infant industry argument is a trade-off between the short-term cost of
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substituting lower-cost imports with higher cost domestic goods and the
long-term benefit of productive efficiency gains (Park and Hur 2002, 1).
In sum, IS policies are aimed solely at cultivating globally competitive industries by
restricting easily obtained foreign goods and promoting and/or subsidizing domestic
production of those goods.
In order to function, IS utilizes several tools to control trade to regulate what is
domestically available. One such tool is the foreign direct investment (FDI). 1 The IS
regimes:
will impose trade barriers to restrict the import of certain products and
encourage the domestic production of these products to displace imports. In
line with escalating trade barriers, the government commonly offers tax or
investment incentives to attract foreign investors to inject capital in these
sectors by establishing plants domestically, either in the form of greenfield
investment or joint ventures (Narjoko, Anas, Herdlyanto 2018, 74).
These mechanisms allow a country utilizing IS to limit and incentivize various companies
and industries as it sees fit. In result, theoretically, they can grow the fledgling industry
until it can compete internationally and therefore cause domestic economic growth.
All systems have merit, just some more than others. In theory, IS, like EP, has
validity and some level of success to claim. However, the reality is pure IS does not enjoy
the level of success its proponents would hope for. In the myriad studies completed on IS,

1

“FDI is different from other forms of capital inflows in that it is not a pure financial investment. It being
an investment with a view to influencing how a company is run, FDI by definition brings in new
management practices. It frequently, although not always, also brings in new technologies. As a result, FDI
affects the productive capabilities of the company that is receiving it, whether it is greenfield FDI, that is, a
foreign company setting up a new subsidiary (like the Intel subsidiary established in Costa Rica in 1997) or
it is brownfield FDI, that is, a foreign company taking over an existing company (like Daewoo, the Korean
carmaker bought by GM in 2002).” (page 308) in Ha-Joon Chang. 2015. Economics: The User's Guide:
Bloomsbury.
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the general findings have found it wanting. As Dionisius Narjoko, Titik Anas, and
Robertus Herdiyanto (2018) explain:
The study confirms the theory and experience of other countries on the
negative impact of import substitution policies. The econometric analysis
shows that trade protection inhibits the performance of the intermediate
input industries. Thus, having a closed trade regime will retard the growth
and development of the industries instead of promoting them, and is
therefore not recommended (Narjoko, Anas, and Herdiyanto 2018, 92).
Likewise, Donghyun Park and Jung Hur (2002) confirm that:
the IS monopolist becomes more efficient only in the very limited sense that
it moves down a given average cost curve, which remains above the world
price everywhere. However, there is no growing up in a more fundamental
sense of the infant industry argument – i.e. the IS industry’s price becoming
competitive with world price. Indeed, in our analysis, the IS industry faces
little incentive to grow up (Park and Hur 2002, 4).
In result, IS policies, in and of themselves, have failed to spur economic growth and
development.
If the policies have proven to be inadequate, how then can they have value? When
it comes to economics, nothing is ever straightforward or clear cut. With IS, there are
gradations that allow some level of protection while attracting foreign investment to spur
growth. If trade protection and liberalization is looked at as a continuum, the terms of
trade can be broken into categories such as low, medium, or high protectionists or
liberalizers. In fact, Mehdi Shafaeddin (2002) did just that. What he found was:
Accordingly, in general, high and medium liberalizers tended to perform
better than the low liberalizers; they had positive GDP, MVA
(manufacturing value added) and export growth, and a greater degree of
production and export diversification during the 1980s. However, the
medium liberalizers performed better than the high liberalizers in respect of
all indicators (Shafaeddin 1995, 4).
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What this shows is there is a middle ground where a country can be successful in
protecting trade in some areas and freeing it in other to spur growth.
On this note, Turan Subasat (2009) argued:
the labelling of import-substitution and export-promotion as alternative and
contradictory trade policies is problematical. Such classification is based on
the unrealistic assumptions of the static two-sector model in which importsubstitution is seen to involve inward-looking policies with state
intervention, while export-promotion is perceived as outward-looking
policies without state intervention (Subasat 2009, 60).
The point being made is that as a model hits real world application, a complex mix of
solutions emerge to drive the country forward. A country may find that one sector is
ready for global competition and open it to free trade, while another needs protection and
tariffs are placed on it, etc. Subasat (2009) furthers:
Although the protection of import-substituting industries and the promotion
of exports are both price distorting, they neutralise each other and produce
outcomes similar to free trade. Such an approach led Greenaway and Nam
(1988) to classify South Korea with mixed (import-substitution and exportpromotion) policies similar to the freer trade regime of Singapore (Subasat
2009, 47).
Ergo, his study shows that reality affords complex solutions to the complex question of
economic development.
It is also important to note that there is strong historical evidence of developing
economies blending ideologies to create a strong path forward. Ha-Joon Chang
chronicled:
Upon independence, most post-colonial nations rejected the free-market
and free-trade policies that had been imposed on them under colonialism.
Some of them became outright socialist (China, North Korea, North
Vietnam and Cuba), but most of them pursued state-led industrialization
strategies while basically remaining capitalist. The strategy is known as the
import substitution industrialization (ISI) strategy – so called because you
are substituting imported manufactured goods with your own. This was
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done by protecting domestic producers from superior foreign competition
by restricting imports (infant industry protection) or heavily regulating the
activities of foreign companies operating within national borders.
Governments often subsidized private-sector producers and set up SOEs
[State Owned Enterprises] in industries in which private-sector investors
were unwilling to invest due to high risk… The ‘miracle’ economies of
South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong grew at 7-8 percent per
year in per capita terms during this period, achieving some of the fastest
growth rates in human history…During the Golden Age of capitalism,
government intervention increased enormously in almost all areas in all
countries, with the exception of international trade in the rich countries.
Despite this, economic performance both in the rich and in the developing
countries was much better than before. It has not been bettered since the
1980s, when state intervention was considerably reduced (Chang 2014, 68).
Ha-Joon drives home an important lesson here. Specifically, the proven path forward
involves some measure of industrial policy, protection, innovation, and the willingness to
engage in the global economy. In the next section, the attention turns to one of the
success stories mentioned above: Singapore. The section will illustrate how Singapore
used its industrial policy to move a resource poor developing nation into developed status
within one generation.

Mixing Trade and Human Capital Development: The case of Singapore

Thus far, this chapter has focused on explaining the competing ideas regarding
trade liberalization vs government intervention in trade and development. Though this is
an important aspect of developmental economics, it is only a partial picture as it ignores
the greater complexities which make industry possible. Yong-Shik Lee (2020) posits:
The mainstream economics adopts a linear approach to economic
development and does not consider interactions and synergies among
‘unlike’ economic agents. Another concern is that economic development
is also affected by political-economic dynamisms, as well as complex
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interactions among the economic entities in the market, but the traditional
theories…capture only a part of this complex process (Lee 2020, 406).
In this analysis, Lee found that developmental economic policies need to consider both
non-traditional synergistic relationships and how the political system interacts with the
policies as whole.
When it comes to non-traditional developmental policies, which consider both
demand and supply side economic theories, Singapore stands out as a great example.
Unlike other LDCs, Singapore was able to create an aggressive development plan which
implemented difficult and novel policies to drive the country forward. In his examination
of Singapore, W.G. Huff (1999) explained that Singapore’s success came from its:
high level of government intervention that promoted macroeconomic
stability. Especially noteworthy is how, although a small country with no
influence on the international economy, Singapore went beyond a rulesbased strategy to use some quite pervasive government interventions in
carefully selected aspects of the domestic economy (Huff 1999, 36).
This desire to go beyond the normal rules is the secret to their success as if they had
followed what their peers were doing in Malaysia or Indonesia, they likely would not
have enjoyed their high level of current success.
To explain, in the late 1950s Singapore split from Malaysia to form its own state.
When it first started standing on its own, as Edwin Lee (2008) points out, “Singapore in
the early 1960s adopted an import-substitution policy” (Lee 2008, 636). Singapore felt it
was necessary to protect its industry from its sister state, and rival, Malaya as it “assumed
that there would be a common market with Malaya, which in the event never
materialized” (Lee 2008, 636). However, this policy was short lived, and a radical new
approach was devised.
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By 1965, Singapore realized that the demand side policies would not work for
them as it was a resource poor nation. It had to rely on imports to meet most of its needs,
especially in terms of manufacturing. Therefore, Singapore needed a dramatic shift from
its demand side policies. As Edwin Lee (2008) explains:
Post 1965, Singapore changed to being a developmental state, definable as
one whose strategy was to manufacture for export to the world at large, and
who executed this strategy through a technocratic elite. The Economic
Development Board (EDB) targeted the multinational enterprises to bring
in. The Singapore developmental state was remarkable for the dominance
of multinational enterprises. Another special feature about Singapore was
that the government itself entered into business. Cabinet ministers oversaw
this government business while civil service, statutory board, and army
technocrats managed it. Hence the term Singapore Inc. has been coined for
it. (Lee 2008, 636-637).
In other words, Singapore began a new regime where state led capitalism would lead the
way. Nicholas J. White (2017) framed it this way, “Lacking the protection of a Greater
Malaysian common market after the 1965 divorce, as well as a primary producing export
base, the island state sought export-oriented industrialization (eoi) to provide
employment opportunities” (White 2017, 235). Or, as W.G. Huff (1999) put it, “in late
1966 Singapore turned outwards for growth, trying to attract foreign direct investment
and to develop exports” (Huff 1999, 34).
Shifting from demand side policies to supply side policies was not new or novel.
What made this stand out is the level of government intervention in the entire process.
Under Singapore’s non-traditional approach, it took a strong interventionist approach to
its economic policies. As W.G. Huff (1999) illustrates, the novelty begins with that fact
that “In Singapore, government intervened in three main aspects of the domestic
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economy, to regulate the labour market, to promote education and training, and to force
high savings” (Huff 1999, 36).
The First novel aspect to Singapore’s developmental approach is seen through its
government’s entanglement in business. As mentioned above, Singapore created an EDB
to target companies to entice, set education criteria (more on that later), and forecast
global trends. Edwin Lee (2008) explains:
The government and the EDB were pragmatic, focused and yet nimble, open
to new ideas. They targeted the multinationals in electronics early in the
rising product cycle of this industry in the 1970s. In the 1980s, they went
for Pharmaceuticals and chemicals… In 1987, a new EDB chairman, Philip
Yeo, set up the National Biotech Committee (Lee 2008, 637).
Historically speaking, the industry choices illustrated the EDB’s ability to accurately
identify global trends. Furthermore, Singapore’s ability to then attract these corporations
is on par with their ability to identify which industries to attract. In terms of attracting
foreign investments, Singapore has, from the outset, followed an aggressive tax incentive
plan. As W.G. Huff (1999) details, “arguably, these were sufficiently large in comparison
to rival countries biding to attract foreign investment” (Huff 1999, 38). Singapore was
willing to outbid others with lower tax rates, but also by providing infrastructure support
(Huff 1999, 39).
The second great novelty of Singapore is found in its approach to human capital
development. For most countries, pouring resources into education looks the same. They
typically follow the same type of rule book teaching general knowledge broadly.
However, Singapore took a different route. As Edwin Lee (2008) described, “knowledgebased economy needed talent, research, and alliances with institutions doing cutting edge
work…. Embracing the global knowledge economy is a highly risky business. But
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Singapore has … a pragmatic desire to apply knowledge to manufacturing” (Lee 2008,
637-638). This pragmatic desire is highlighted in its approach, as chronicled by W.G.
Huff (1999):
By late 1967 the Singapore government had taken control of the educational
system and begun to run it on managerial (as opposed to academic or
collegiate) principles aimed at maximizing short-to-medium-term
economic growth and preventing graduate unemployment. Singapore
wanted, explained Goh Keng Swee the architect of its economic
development, to avoid ‘the mistakes which nearly all developing countries
are now making -over producing unemployable numbers of educated white
collar workers and not turning out the skilled artisans and technicians we
need for industrial growth’ (Singapore, Ministry of Labour, 1969, front
cover). To meet these objectives the government pursued two main policies,
backing them with what has authoritatively been described as ‘heavy state
subsidization’, a substantial proportion of which went to higher
education…access to education was tightly rationed through a competitive,
strictly merit-based system and at the same time government changed the
educational mix. …Second, education became a key part of industrial
policy. Worker skills were developed in quite specific areas, targeted
through a review process including close EDB consultation with foreign
multinationals, to complement strongly Singapore’s other measures to
attract desired foreign investment (Huff 1999, 41).
Though there is a lot to unpack with Huff’s chronical, the highlight is that the
government wanted to achieve the strict goal of educating for the purpose of
employment. The entire educational system in Singapore was upended and remolded to
suit the goal of attracting foreign companies to its shores by offering not only fiscal
incentives, but a vast supply of labor educated specifically for that company’s field/type
of work. As W.G. Huff (1999) stated, “Judged by its objectives of maximizing economic
growth and minimizing graduate unemployment, Singapore’s educational strategy was
highly successful” (Huff 1999, 41).
The final novel policy of Singapore is its government’s severe austerity. As W.G.
Huff illustrates, “But government consumption as a share of GDP remained low by any
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standard, averaging 11.1%of GDP in the 1980s and under 10% in the 1990s” (Huff 1999,
35). Part of why Singapore can offer amazing incentives to foreign investors is because
the government not only runs at a surplus, but the surplus is financed through alternative
means. For example, Singapore created a business group to invest its reserves.
Additionally, the state runs profitable monopolies in utilities and telecommunications,
both of which feed back into the budget and ensuring a surplus on government spending.
Singapore’s success in development can be viewed as the genius of advanced
planning by a benevolent government. As Ha-Joon Chang (2014) explains, “the success
of Singapore’s unique combination of free-market policies and socialist policies … is a
case in point” (Chang 2014, 106). Singapore is a country with no exportable natural
resources to exploit, thereby avoiding the issues explained in the Prebisch-Singer
hypothesis. However, according to Carlota Perez (2017), this may have been a benefit to
the growing economy. She explains:
[Singapore] had to devise a way of using import protection and export
subsidies to achieve export-led growth. They thus provided sheltered
learning time to their ‘infant industries’ and facilitated the emergence and
growth of competitive exporting companies and industrial complexes,
uniting high productivity with low-cost labor and producing advancedcountry quality goods at developing country costs (Perez 2017, 360).
Therefore, it is a strong credit to Singapore that its government was willing to take strong
risks to forego formal economic models to instead embrace practical solutions that have
since proven effective. Once again, this illustrates that Singapore is a strong example of
the developmentalist mindset.
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Discussion
The focus of this chapter was to compare the main developmental economic
ideology to a proven alternate ideology. The oversimplified view is a contrast between
removing government control versus increasing governmental involvement in the
planning and running of the economy. As this paper illustrates, the IMF falls into the first
category, and by extension Jamaica does due to its dependence on the IMF. The
contrasting view comes from the developmentalist approach by Singapore. Though, it
must be asked, is this a fair comparison. Jamaica is a resource rich country that has
several agricultural products, such as coffee, bananas, and sugar, as well as the raw
aluminum ore bauxite. Conversely, Singapore does not have any real resource from
which to pull from. Therefore, one could say that Jamaica is on the wrong side of the
Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, whereas Singapore is on the beneficial side. Returning to the
question, this may not be a fair assessment as there are significant differences in the
composition of the economy and the culture. However, lessons can still be learned and
applied. Before diving in, it is important to note the spirit of the approach, not the letter of
the approach is what matters in application. Carlota Perez (2017) explains this elegantly:
Could the Latin Americans make such a leap now? It would be fruitless to
attempt to replicate the Asian route to development. That particular window
of opportunity has passed, and the current context is completely
different…[however] the conditions are ripe for a new type of natural
resource–intensive industrialization process, whereby exploitation of
natural resources and, crucially, their processing are used as the springboard
for industrialization and economic development (Perez 2017, 361-2).
In other words, countries like Jamaica are not going to follow the exact same path as
Singapore, but they can learn from the overall process and ideological approach.
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One such lesson to learn from Singapore is, as Subasat (2009) explains:
Industrial policies in general and trade policies in particular should carefully
be designed according to a country’s specific circumstances. Development
is a non-linear and complex process and no simple trade rules can be advised
to developing countries. Development requires sensible and pragmatic trade
policies in which import substitution, export promotion and free trade are
an essential integral part (Subasat 2009, 60).
Therefore, the question is not which of the binary choices should the policies be based.
Instead, one should ask where on the continuum is the greatest value for their
development. Or, as Carlota Perez (2010) describes, in terms of driving technological
advances as developmental policy tools, “The decision processes involved are not
random. They are shaped by a context that includes relative prices, regulatory and other
institutional factors and, obviously, the perceived market potential of the innovations
concerned” (Perez 2010, 186). Singapore exemplified this by their methodical approach
to changing the education system to fit the technological expertise needed for the high
growth industries. This is also a process that is seemingly ignored by IMFSPs.
A second lesson from Singapore is its emphasis on its people. Specifically, since
Singapore had no natural resources to exploit, it instead saw the population as their
national resource. In other words, its endowment of resources lent itself to supply side
policies, and it dove headlong into them. Singapore realized there was a global demand
for lower-cost labor in skilled fields which required specialized education. Rather than
only focusing on upgrading their infrastructure, it turned its attention to developing the
supply of labor needed. This paid rather large dividends. W.G. Huff detailed, “During
1985-1995 Singapore drew in more direct foreign investment per capita than any country,
developed or developing, and double that of the country ranking second. The Republic
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now hosts some 5,000 multinational enterprises” (Huff 1999, 35). In result of these
foreign investments, “Between 1978 and 1991 real wages doubled and by 1997 had risen
a further 31%. … Perhaps more indicative of the move from being a low-wage centre is
that compensation costs (wages plus all other benefits) for manufacturing production
workers rose from 13% of the USA’s level in 1972 to 50% by 1997” (Huff 1999, 37). On
this note, there is a clear contrast between the way Singapore approached and handled
FDI versus how Jamaica has. Singapore created strong partnerships that create a mutually
beneficial system which allows Singapore to be a hub and headquarters for foreign
companies. This keeps the resources in Singapore and helps its overall economic growth.
Conversely, Jamaica’s approach to FDI has best exemplified in the fact that it sold the
entire bauxite mining quarries to China, rather than simply selling the raw ore to them.
This causes an expatriation of resources and an overall lack of higher paying jobs, as
those go to the country of ownership.
Overall, this chapter has provided a contrast between neo-liberal policies
influenced by the Washington Consensus and the developmentalist ideas influenced by
the need to achieve practical goals in out of the norm ways. Therefore, Jamaica’s IMFinfluenced policies appear ineffectual compared to those of the developmentalist
influenced industrial policy of Singapore. The result of these divergent policies has left
Jamaica in need of continual IMF loans whereas Singapore stands out as an economic
development success story. The question, then, is what lessons from Singapore’s story
can Jamaica integrate into their own? As Carlota Perez (Could Technology Make Natural
Resources a Platform for Industrialization?, 2017) explained, the path forged by
Singapore cannot be followed exactly by other countries. The reason being is its approach
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is unique only to Singapore’s resources, cultural composition, and unique place and time
in history. However, this does not mean the process followed to forge that path (i.e., a
carefully tailored industrial policy according to the resources and needs of Singapore)
cannot be applied. Therefore, Jamaica would do well to adapt Singapore’s
developmentalist process to its own.
In terms of implementation, the first step is for Jamaica to realize that the Now
Developed Countries (NDCs) are not playing fair. Specifically, as Ha-Joon (Economics:
The user’s guide, 2014) described earlier in the chapter, NDCs developed through strong
interventionist policies, like IS and high tariffs, to protect and grow their industries. Once
those countries developed, they turned to liberalized trade policies to maintain their
dominate status. These same countries now seek to convince less developed countries to
abandon the protectionist policies that NDCs used to develop and instead adopt trade
liberalization. The lesson Jamaica can take away from this is it is worth Jamaica’s time to
find industries they can thrive in, if given a chance to develop, and protect those while
opening other strategic areas to liberalized trade. That is, Jamaica should follow a similar
industrial policy the NDCs followed on their growth paths.
Step two for Jamaica is to understand that development will have a much higher
chance of success if there is a concerted effort in integrating demand and supply side
economic policies. Paramount to the supply side considerations is human capital
development through healthcare and education. Integration comes when demand side
considerations influence the supply side development of education. For example, if
Jamaica decides that it wants to have a heavy focus on agricultural development, it
should realign its education system to produce labor with the education and training in
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that field. Likewise, if Jamaica wants to focus on the burgeoning industry of artificial
intelligence or drive innovation in renewable energy, it should realign education to
produce specialized labor for these industries. Similarly, a healthy population would add
to the overall productivity of the Jamaican economy. Similar to Singapore, the marriage
of demand and supply side policies greatly increase the chance of success for sustained
economic development.
The third step is for Jamaica to develop an industrial policy that aligns with its
resources and industries of choice. Jamaica is a resource rich country with a long history
of supplying agricultural products to the global marketplace. Jamaica’s policies should
include ways to drive the maximum efficiency in the agricultural sector while finding
ways to promote and protect the exports of their produce. This may include subsidies to
offset international tariffs on their agricultural exports. Additionally, Jamacia has
traditionally been a global shipping hub for sea transport between Europe, Asia, and the
Americas. Its industrial policy, like with Singapore, should devise creative ways to attract
foreign companies to rely on Jamaica as the main logistical global sea transport hub. This
would also provide a great chance to develop FDI as companies can be enticed to
establish headquarters, or perhaps manufacturing, in Jamaica as it rises in prominence as
a logistical hub. This would be further enhanced if Jamaica realigns its educational
system to meet the needs of specific companies that it wants to entice to its shores. In
sum, an integrative industrial policy approach in the spirit of Singapore would better
serve Jamaica than the current Washington Consensus model in use. The marriage of
demand and supply economics breeds the opportunity for attracting meaningful FDI that
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would allow Jamaica to become a global hub for sea transport and whatever other
industry it feels would best suit its resources and human capital.
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Chapter Four: Healthcare and Education
Introduction:
Of the natural laws that govern mankind, one of the more pervasive in political
economics is the law of unintended consequences. Unintended consequences are most
visible in retrospect, long after a policy was planned and implemented. A question that
must be addressed is: are there unintended consequences of the IMFSP? To answer, this
section will evaluate the supply side policies investing in human capital. Of specific
concern is the following: does the IMFSP’s reliance on demand side policies reduce the
needed resources to ensure the population has adequate healthcare and education? This
paper posits that the IMFSP hampers developmental resources, which stifles long term
growth prospects of the country being stabilized. One question is, have the austerity
measures prescribed by the IMFSP had an impact on healthcare outcomes? Likewise,
how have the investment in education changed in result of the IMFSP, and how might
these changes affect the growth potential of Jamaica?
Keynes (1923) once quipped “in the long run we are all dead” (Keynes 1923, 80).
In many respects Keynes was right. There is a great deal of focus on the short run, in
terms of economic policy, that needs to occur. However, there are some long run factors
that should not be ignored. Specifically, healthcare and education are essential needs to
move an economy forward. As
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Smith and Ashiabi (2007) explain, “human capital formation is central to
economic development, reduction of poverty, health, and crime rates” (Smith and Ashiabi
2007, 851). Specifically, an educated and healthy populace provide the necessary means
for sustained economic growth and development. Therefore, these areas must be a
priority for a government to ensure long term success for generations to come.
Before delving into the analysis, it is important to explain the noise in the data
which can distract from the issue at hand. Specifically, this relates to the role various
organizations play in the direction of healthcare and education policies, procedures, and
funding. When a country is under an IMFSP, it is easy to fall under the assumption that
the bulk of the direction comes from the IMF. This, however, is not the case. The IMF
sets specific rules in some areas like monetary policy and divestment from state own
businesses. In other areas, like healthcare and education, the IMF will set an expectation
that resources will be given towards their development, with the understanding that the
country will work with development partners like the WB, IDB, WHO, PAHO, etc. This
is seen clearly in Jamaica, where the IMF did set this expectation and Jamaica did partner
with these, and other, organizations to fund healthcare and education.
The temptation, then, is to veer off on a tangent to explain how the policies of
these ancillary organizations affected outcomes. Though the policies are important to
outcomes, there is a larger issue which is the foundation of the system: funding. Before
jumping into the data, it is important to put the data into its proper context. The facts and
figures are indeed provided by organizations outside of the IMF. Additionally, human
capital development outcomes have been affected to some unquantified degree by these
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policies. However, the hope is that the case made will show the issues caused by the
IMFSPs funding limitations.
This chapter aims to address two main questions. First, how does the IMFSP
impact financing for human capital development, in which healthcare and education
financing are examined specifically? Second, how does this impact effect development
outcomes in these areas? The answer will be broken into two sections. The first section
examines Health outcomes, where the main concern will be Non-Communicable
Diseases (NCDs). The second section will look at outcomes in in primary and secondary
schooling, which in the USA is formally known as Kindergarten through High School (k12) education.

Healthcare
In terms of healthcare there are a myriad of topics and health outcomes that can
be discussed. Of the topics the two areas that were found to be most indicative of
economic stability and growth are that of capacity/utilization and the health outcomes of
non-communicable diseases (NCDs). Capacity is important for obvious reasons, as the
best funded system is worthless without the ability to serve patients. However, NCDs
may not be obvious, therefore it is important to explain. The UNIAFT, UNDP, and
PAHO’s joint paper (2018) explains:
NCDs are a major driver of morbidity and mortality in Jamaica. Beyond the
toll on health, NCDs also impose a significant burden on the national
economy since individuals with NCDs are more likely to exit the labor
force, miss days of work, and/or work at reduced capacity. In addition, high
expenditures to treat NCDs impose a direct economic burden to the health
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system, the society and to the nation (UNIAFT, UNDP, and PAHO 2018,
1).
As this paper explained, NCD’s carry tremendous weight in overall health outcomes and
therefore are a great measure of a successful health system.
An important note for this section is that the analysis needs to be framed such that
the policies, however they may change, are held as a constant vector. The variable under
examination here is that which is affected by the IMFSP: financing and the ability of the
proposed financing to reach its destination. In other words, this section is interested in
illustrating the demand side policy effect, if any, on the supply considerations. Therefore,
the review of healthcare outcomes will be provided as color to our picture, not be the
entire picture itself. Instead, the analysis will dive into utilization rates, staffing rates, and
migration of healthcare professionals as adequate measures of these policy effects. This
provides a greater insight to the long-term success of the Jamaican system in light of the
IMFSP.

A brief historical background of Jamaican healthcare system

The current mission of Jamaica’s Ministry of Health and Wellness (MOH),
formally the Ministry of Health, is “to ensure the provision of quality health services and
to promote healthy lifestyles and environmental practices” (Ministry of Health and
Wellness 2019). This mission drives the MOH to offer health services to all residents of
Jamaica. The route taken to get to this mission has a history that spans hundreds of years
and covers colonial rule under both the Spanish and the English. However, Jamaica’s
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current system of healthcare did not begin to take root until the 1970s. Jamaica’s history
had taught it that quality primary care and education was essential to health on the island.
Additionally, as the PAHO (2001) explains “The right to health care is guaranteed by the
provision of health services in the public sector. The law guarantees the right to health. It
is a tradition inherited from the British Commonwealth system. Thus, the health system is
rooted in the principles of the British National Health Service (NHS) Act” (PAHO 2001,
18).
During the 1970s, Jamaica pioneered the primary healthcare team, which
provided an integrative approach to healthcare rather than continue their current
segmented model. Leading up to the full adoption and implementation of the Healthcare
Team, Jamaican medical professionals banded together to determine where each of their
boundaries of service should be, how they were interrelated, and how they should interact
with one another. Some of the changes that were brought about was the creation of
Community Health Aids (CHA) who liaised between the system and the community, well
defined boundaries to the health districts, two categories of Nurse Practitioners were
created (family and pediatrics), as well as school dental nurses. Also, Jamaica set a goal
that all residents should live within 10 miles of a healthcare provider. As part of the
expansive medical services goal, the district care model had to be further broken down.
Specifically, primary care was given four distinct regions throughout the island. This
made governance of primary care facilities more manageable for administrative staff. The
1970s were marked by large changes in the delivery and management of healthcare.
Access to all residents greatly increased and health outcomes were trending in positive
directions. Jamaica learned invaluable lessons on primary healthcare in the 1970s. Due to
67

this, as (McCaw-Binns and Moody (2001) explain, when global leaders gathered together
in 1978 at Alma Alta, Former Soviet Union (modern day Kazakhstan), for the historic
Primary Health Care conference, Jamaica was able to present their plan and helped shape
global views on primary care.
In the decades leading up to the turn of the century, each decade brought about its
own unique change and focus to the Jamaica healthcare system. The Pan American
Health Organization (PAHO, 2001) described the decades succinctly in their country
review. They described the 1970s as focusing on the creation of a large network of
decentralized primary health care facilities. “In the 1980s the focus became the
rationalization of public health facilities and management strengthening, in particular
hospital management improvements” (PAHO 2001, 16). This decade was influenced by
the IMF as part of its conditionality for further funding. Specifically, in efforts to bring
about greater efficiency in the system Jamaica’s healthcare system was required to effect
changes. During this time effective management was promoted and strengthened.
Additionally, some hospital services were divested and a program to recover hospital
costs was introduced. Furthermore, in 1985 the IMF requested that the amount of CHAs
be reduced in half. This greatly hampered community outreach, which is contractionary
considering that part of the new focus was social marketing of health services. The
efficiency push bled into the next decade as 1993 saw the introduction of user fees to the
system. This caused a reduction in healthcare service utilization by the community.
From Jamaica’s healthcare inception until the late 1990s, Jamaica had visibly
moved towards establishing quality healthcare for its population. This is most evident in
the late 1990s as it “brought a more comprehensive and coordinated approach to health
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sector reform with the primary objectives being the reformulation of the role of the
MOH, financial sustainability, quality assurance and equity” (PAHO 2001, 17). In 1997
Jamaica passed the National Health Services Act (NHSA) which decentralized the MOH
and officially created four Regional Health Authorities (RHA). Under this law the MOH
retains “responsibility for policy, planning, regulatory action and purchasing while the
four RHAs are now responsible for health service delivery in all 14 Jamaican parishes”
(World Bank 2014, 4). Prior to this law, the MOH allowed the Principal Medical Officer
to delegate management of primary care into four regional management teams. However,
this law expanded on this autonomy to include all healthcare, not just that of primary
care. The main benefit of this was that hospitals no longer had to worry about the budget
and could focus solely on providing care. Budgetary concerns were now addressed by an
officer who works directly with the MOH board, which governs the budgets of all public
hospitals on the island.
Thus far the history has focused primarily on the Government of Jamaica’s (GOJ)
role in developing the healthcare system. However, it is not the only player in this arena.
The private sector has also offered health services since the colonial days. In result, the
Jamaican system is marked by both public and private systems. Though both systems
offer full range of healthcare to the island, there are definite biases in scale and type of
services provided by each. Specifically, the public system provides most of all primary
health and hospital care whereas the private sector provides most outpatient, ambulatory,
and pharmaceutical services. It is important to note that Jamaica sees healthcare as a
right, A trait it inherited from the British National Health Services act. In result, the fees
assessed have always been low and disconnected from the actual cost of healthcare. In
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theory, this means that the Out of Pocket (OOP) spending from the population should be
low. However, this has not been the case as Jamaicans still required services from the
private sector, like medications and higher quality care provided by physicians in the
private sector.
It is important to remember that central to the core of the Jamaican healthcare
system is the belief that healthcare is a right. Previously it was explained that Jamaica
bought into the vision of the World Health Assembly at the 1978 Alma Alta conference.
As McCaw-Binns and Moody (2001) explain, this conference set a vision of achieving
“health for all by year 2000” (McCaw-Binns and Moody 2001, 9). As part of the vision
and desire to bring healthcare to all, Jamaica had engaged in planning a National
Healthcare Insurance Plan (NHIP). As Shiyan Chao (2013) explains:
Discussions on some version of national health insurance were started in the
1960s when the National Insurance Scheme was established. Discussions
and studies on establishing a national health insurance plan (NHIP)
continued from the 1970s into the early 2000s, with support from
international agencies (IDB and PAHO). However, the ideas never gathered
enough political traction (Chao 2013, 5).
Though the NHIP never came about, it did pave the way for the next great step in
Jamaican healthcare system, which came in 2005, through the creation of the National
Health Fund (NHF). Specifically, Shiyan Chao (2013) continues:
The NHF adopted the mission, goals, and principles of the NHIP, as
described in the Green Paper… Because NCDs had become the major
causes of morbidity and mortality, the NHF aimed to introduce a public
health management approach to their treatment by providing individual and
institutional health care benefits to Jamaicans (Chao 2013, 6).
The WB (2012) frames it this way:
Its main objective is to reduce the cost of treatment for NCDs by providing
free or subsidized medicines to patients with a number of NCD conditions.
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The NHF also finances prevention programs, principally the Healthy
Lifestyles Program administered through the Ministry of Health and
Environment (MOHE) (World Bank 2012, 36).
As discussed above, Jamaica had set out on a goal to achieve universal access to
healthcare. As Chao (2013) explains “The approach to universal coverage that Jamaica
took consists of two main policy interventions: the establishment of the Jamaica National
Health Fund (NHF) in 2003 and the abolition of user fees at public facilities in 2008”
(Chao 2013, 1). Therefore in 2003 the NHF was created, in 2008 Jamaica abolished user
fees at all public facilities, and then in 2011 the NHF took full responsibility of the
medications they cover. Specifically, they became responsible for procurement, storage,
and distribution via its public “DrugServ” pharmacies (World Bank 2014, 3). It is
interesting to note that the policies from the 80s and 90s had clear indications of driving
efficiency, whereas this trend is bucked with the push towards a universal healthcare
system.
From Jamaica’s independence to today, the common goal has been to create a
healthcare system that has universal access, affordable care, and excellent health
outcomes. The path going forward from here is to continue building on the previous
successes of the NHF and the removal of fees, with a goal of a NHIP still on the table. In
his 2019 status of healthcare speech to parliament Doctor Honorable Chris Tufton, MP
(2019) explains these goals as he outlined a path forward. He first framed the major
challenge, explaining:
Mr. Speaker, perhaps the greatest challenge of all is a population mindset
that has accepted the right to health, but not personal responsibility for
protecting their health… unless we make a change, it is also a mindset that
will see us continuing to suffer from preventable illnesses, premature
disability and death, and emotional suffering (Tufton 2019, 4).
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To address these issues Dr. Hon Tufton is creating plans to educate the population on
healthy lifestyles, he is urging the passing of a NHIP, he is working on expanding
facilities to accommodate the higher demand, and he is trying to attract and retain
qualified health workers. In his conclusion, he states:
Mr. Speaker, this Administration hears the people’s cry for more hospital
beds and operating theatres, and we see the NCD epidemic that is bedeviling
us. We are intervening not only for today, but also for the future! We have
a plan on the way forward for public health, and it involves not just doctors
and nurses, but all of us as citizens and stakeholders. It is not just about
curing diseases, but also preventing diseases. It’s about lifestyle. It is about
a state of mind. We also have plans for community health centres and
hospitals, and for our school children and the environment (Tufton 2019,
19).
Overall, Jamaica is continuing its goal of providing universal care. It realizes its
shortcomings and is working to address them. Whether or not it is sustainable or effective
will be determined in due time.

Healthcare System and Financing

Before delving into the history and outcomes of the Jamaican healthcare system,
two important facts must be explained. The first important fact is the composition of the
healthcare system, that is how its sectors are divided. The second important fact to
understand is how these sectors are financed in Jamaica.
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Health System:
According to Shiyan Chao (2013) Jamaica has a unique healthcare system that is
portioned in several ways. Specifically, Shiyan Chao (2013) explains, “Jamaica’s health
system involves a mix of the public and private sectors. The public sector is the primary
provider of public health and hospital services, while the private sector dominates
ambulatory services and the provision of pharmaceuticals” (Shiyan Chao 2013, 1).
Additionally, in an earlier work, Shiyan Chao (2012) explains that Jamaica also created a
prescription drug assistance program under the moniker the National Health Fund (NHF).
Chao explains “Jamaica has created mechanisms, notably the National Health Fund,
2003, (NHF) to assist individuals to purchase prescription drugs for managing and
treating chronic illnesses” (Shiyan Chao 2012, 12).
According to Shiyan Chao (2013) the Public sector is divided as follows:
The public sector includes the Ministry of Health (MOH) and its agencies;
four Regional Health Authorities (RHAs); and an extensive network of
secondary and tertiary care facilities, consisting of 24 second level
hospitals, including five specialist institutions and primary care facilities,
comprising 322 primary health centers and four community hospitals,
which are managed by the four RHAs. The public sector also includes the
University Hospital of the West Indies and its Medical School and 10 dental
and two family planning clinics . . . The functions of the MOH were
decentralized in 1997 under the National Health Services Act. The Ministry
is responsible for policy, planning, regulating, and purchasing functions,
while the four RHAs are in charge of health service delivery. This reform
aimed to increase the efficiency and responsiveness of the health sector to
local needs. The RHAs provide health services through a nested system of
health centers and hospitals. Pharmaceutical and diagnostic services are
available at all hospitals and some health centers, and the National Public
Health Laboratory serves as the national referral center. The RHAs are
responsible for delivering health care services to all 14 parishes. (Shiyan
Chao 2013, 1-2).
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Therefore, the public sector is involved primarily with providing healthcare
services directly to Jamaicans at the various clinics and hospitals. Additionally, the public
health sector encompasses the NHF to provide prescription assistance. The aim of this
assistance is to help manage the non-communicable disease (NCD) epidemic in Jamaica.
To support and augment the public sector, Shiyan Chao (2013) explains the
private sector also provides vital services:
The private sector is playing an important role in health care. Private health
care is provided by general physicians and specialists, private laboratories
and pharmacies, and a few hospitals. Nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) also provide ambulatory care, targeting the poorer segments of the
population. The past decade has witnessed a growing private sector,
particularly in the areas of ambulatory health services and pharmaceutical
supplies. The private sector delivers 75 percent of all ambulatory care and
82 percent of all pharmaceutical purchases. The private sector owns nine
small hospitals (25 percent of all hospitals in the country), although it
provides less than 6 percent of total bed capacity (Shiyan Chao 2013, 2).
It is important to note that the Private sector both augments and compliments the public
health sector. Specifically, it is shown that it complements the system by providing
necessary services, such as ambulatory services, which addresses a public shortfall.
Likewise, the public sector augments the public sector by providing similar services on a
private basis. This is important as the public system is not capable of handling demand on
its own. As the Jamaica’s Minister of Health and Wellness, Dr. the honorable
Christopher Tufton, pointed out in his sector update speech to the Jamaican parliament
“Mr. Speaker, the concept of this waiting time intervention includes a more efficient
record of all requests for these services in the public health sector, and the contracting of
private providers, where necessary, to enhance what is already being offered in the public
health system” (Dr. Hon Christopher Tufton 2019, 9).
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On this note, the private sector offers private health insurance for those who can
afford it. This insurance is accepted at both the private and public facilities. As Dr. Hon.
Christopher Tufton (2019) bemoans:
Mr. Speaker, only 20% of the population have health insurance – more than
half of these are public sector workers. The lack of insurance means that too
many people, including the poor and vulnerable, are denied access to timely
medical care. . . Let me also say, Mr. Speaker, that persons who have private
health insurance and use the public health system, as some do, without using
their cards, are subsidizing private insurance providers at the expense of the
public health system and the taxpayer…I want to use this opportunity to
make an appeal to those Jamaicans who can afford private insurance to get
it. It is an investment in yourself, the best that you can make. Also, I want
to say to the private insurance companies, find creative ways to get more
Jamaicans to get insurance (Dr. Hon Christopher Tufton 2019, 7).
Altogether, Jamaica has a system the utilizes both public and private means by
which to deliver healthcare services. The two systems provide services independent of
one another. However, the private sector also partners with the public sector to both
augment and complement the public sector. Though, too few people use the private
insurance and that places a larger burden on the public sector, thus the need for continued
and growing partnerships.

Financing:

Jamaica’s healthcare system utilizes a complex system of public, private, and
NGO facilities and services. Consequently, Jamaica utilizes a mix of private, public, and
Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) sources of funding. According to Shiyan Chao
(2013), “the public sector accounted for 46 percent of total health expenditure, while
private health insurance covered 16 percent, and out-of-pocket payments made up 36
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percent (figure [6]). International donors and NGOs covered only 2 percent of total health
expenditure” (Chao 2013, 3). In terms of funding the various systems, the NGO and
private sector provisions are self-explanatory. NGOs provide funding through both grants
and loans to Jamaica, as well as directly funding the services they provide. Private
organizations are funding be the insurance dues paid as well as the fees assessed for
services rendered. Therefore, the area of most concern is the public financing aspect of
the Jamaican healthcare system.
In terms of financing for the public sector, the PAHO-WHO Country Cooperation
Strategy (2016) explains: “The Government’s health expenditures are financed mainly
through tax revenues” (PAHO-WHO 2016, 28). Within that category, Jamaica has
several programs that are served by various tax programs. The Ministry of Health and
Wellness (MOH) receives is funding from general taxation. Specifically, as Anya
Cushnie (2010) elucidates in her master’s thesis, “Jamaica has a primarily tax‐funded
system with general taxation providing 90% of the MOH budget. These taxes may
include: property and asset taxes, the general consumption tax (GCT) and income tax on
statutory income” (Cushnie, 2010, 23). The other major arm of the public healthcare
system is the National Health Fund (NHF). Like the MOH, the NHF is also supported by
taxes. Specifically, the World Bank (2012) explains “the NHF collects its revenues from
tobacco excise tax, special consumption tax (imposed on petrol, alcohol, and motor
vehicles) and payroll tax on annual earnings paid by employees and employers” (WB
2012, 38). In Figure 6, the flow of the financing is illustrated, which visually elucidates
healthcare funding sources and destination.
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Figure 6: Financing Flows in the Jamaican Health Sector, 2009 (Chao 2013, page 3)
Due to the nature of tax funding, it is economic centric, ergo it is dependent on the
health of the economy and related to economic activity. In the history section it explains
that Jamaica abolished user fees in 2008, coincidentally that was the start of the Great
Recession. This scenario provides ample example of how tax revenue decreases affect
services. During this specific period, service costs expanded as revenues were falling. In
addition to the natural decline in revenues during a recession, other factors can impact
funding levels and service outcomes. For example, the IMF began a structural adjustment
loan around this time as well, which had austere measures attached. The PAHO-WHO
(2010) explain during this time “The data shows that there is a general downward trend in
Health Care Financing. This has been compounded by a recent decision of the
Government to reduce the national budget by 20%” (PAHO/WHO 2010, 28). The
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reduction in national budget was needed to meet IMF goals and to allow fiscal space for
debt service. In other words, this reduction was a demand side policy that had a
downstream effect on a supply side consideration.
Another example or a secondary factor is found with sin taxes. To lessen the
burden of NCDs on Jamaica, the GOJ desired to reduce consumption/use of tobacco.
Consequently, the GOJ enacted legislation to affect this end: “On September 24, 2003,
Jamaica formally signed the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control spearheaded by
the WHO, and the excise tax on cigarettes was increased by 23 percent. On April 18,
2005, there was a further increase of tobacco product taxation that brought the excise tax
up to 49.3 percent” (WB 2012, 32). The result of this action was “The tobacco excise tax
contributed the largest share (23 percent) up to 2006, when the major national tobacco
producer (Carreras Limited) relocated to Trinidad and Tobago” (WB 2012, 39).
Therefore, external factors can and will compound any weakness in the financing of a
program whether it be the IMF or a well-intended cessation program that causes a
company to flee for lower taxes.
Returning to the subject of the IMF, it has had an indirect effect on Jamaica’s
healthcare financing. First, it did not directly impact the healthcare budget in terms of
services or policies. Instead, it created pressure on the fiscal space allotted to healthcare,
especially in terms of wages of the providers. Specifically, the IMF country report (2010)
explains “New compensation agreements will be better aligned with the budget process
and budget constraints to ensure that the government’s objective of reducing the size of
the wage bill from 11¾ percent of GDP to about 9½ percent over the next four years is
achieved” (IMF 2010, 47). As will be shown later, staffing is very difficult for Jamaica’s
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health care system, therefore a pressure on the wages for the MOH may create further
issues to staffing levels and available services. Once again, the demand side fiscal policy
affected the supply of healthcare.
Second, the IMF has conditionality on Jamaica’s budget and economic health in
order to maintain financial support under the IMFSP. This has the unintended
consequence of constraining Jamaica’s ability to receive outside funding. For instance, as
the PAHO-WHO (2010) explain, “During 2009, Government's fiscal constraints limited
its capacity to take advantage of available loans from Multilateral Financial Institutions”
(PAHO-WHO 2010, 35). In result of the recession and fiscal constraints, the WB (2014)
explains “long wait times, insufficient supplies, inadequate human resource levels and
poor quality of services in public facilities have driven an increase in usage of private
facilities even among the poorest” (WB 2014, 3). Or, as Shiyan Chao (2013) furthers:
The demand and costs are driven up by demographic, epidemiological,
technological, and social factors. Limited economic growth and lack of
fiscal space has made it difficult to expand the coverage to meet increasing
demand. Inadequate and, to some extent, inefficiently used, public sector
resources have resulted in shortages of staff, supplies, and drugs, and a lack
of maintenance of equipment and buildings (Chao 2013, 5).
The initial evidence points to the IMFSP as a culprit which has constrained
Jamaica’s healthcare budget indirectly. The result of this funding constraint can be seen
in the total Out-of-Pocket (OOP) spending by Jamaicans and the GOJ as seen in Figures
6 and 7. Without user fees, utilization of public facilities increased. Without needed fiscal
space, demand cannot be met. However, an honest assessment leaves room for criticism
for the Jamaican system making healthcare as publicly funded and available as possible
without having the depth of resources needed for such an endeavor. How much of the
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budget issues are really from IMF constraints vs inefficient allocation of resources vs the
implementation of a universal health system before the country can sustain the resources
needed? This question will need additional research beyond the scope of this paper.
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Health Outcomes
While delving into Jamaica’s health outcomes, it is important to explain the exact
questions at hand. Specifically, Jamaica’s health system has two major forces pulling on
it at once, but only one is of concern. The first area is that of financing. The second,
which is very much linked to the first, is efficiently driving greater health outcomes. Out
of the second goal a great deal of policy changes has been proposed with some of them
implemented. Though those changes do have visible impacts on healthcare, it is beyond
the scope of this paper to research. Instead, this paper is concerned with how the IMF
demand centric policies benefit or hinder healthcare in the area in which the IMF is
genuinely concerned, that is healthcare funding. Therefore, after presenting the raw data,
it is important to discuss the data in relation to financing.
In terms of the analysis, there are two prominent themes of import. The first
theme is Jamaica’s ability to meet its healthcare needs. That is, does Jamaica have the
facilities, supplies, or staff to meet demand? The second theme is in the type of main
health crisis facing the island: non-communicable diseases (NCD). Therefore, in the
following sub-sections the utilization and capacity, as well as the health outcomes of
NCDs will examined to determine if they are adequately funded or hindered by the
IMFSP.
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Utilization and Capacity
This section will examine the current capacity and utilization of the Jamaican
healthcare system. In terms of capacity, there are a couple of areas to look at. The first
aspect is the physical property of capacity, the plant and equipment if you will.
Therefore, it is important to look at the number of facilities, the efficacy of facility
placement, level of equipment, etc. The second aspect of capacity is human capital.
Specifically, are there enough doctors, nurses, specialists, and support staff to meet the
demand. Conversely, in terms of utilization, it is important to know who is using what as
well as how much and how often.
To start, in terms of physical capacity Jamaica is broken into four regions, which
each have their own regional management. Across the four regions there are a total of 24
hospitals and 348 primary care facilities. The total hospital bed distribution is 1.79 beds
per 1,000 individuals. In perspective, the WHO finds this hospital bed density perfectly
adequate for rural areas. However, “in the urban tertiary level institutions, the bed
capacity is inadequate to meet the needs of the population” (WHO CCS 2010, 24). In
2013, Shiyan Chao explained healthcare in Jamaica was “considered inefficient and
lacking in human resources and with poor infrastructure and equipment. Complaints are
on the rise regarding long waiting times, insufficient supplies, and the poor quality of
services in public facilities” (Chao 2013, 17). Six years later, in his sectoral update
speech, Dr. Chris Tufton furthers this sentiment by stating:
Let’s look at waiting time in our hospitals. We have patients waiting over a
year for general surgeries, such as hernia. For other procedures, such as
hysterectomies or myomectomies, we have patients waiting for over 10
months. For surgeries, including radical prostatectomy, we have patients
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waiting for over six months. Mr. Speaker, people die waiting. Frankly
speaking, long waiting times also make a farce of free health care and the
concept of universal access to health care. We have to intervene and fix it!
(Tufton 2019, 9).
In this quote, Dr. Tufton is setting up the issue that Jamaica has quite the capacity
problem that needs to address.
It is also important to note that there is some positive news on the horizon. In the
same 2019 speech, Dr Chris Tufton lays out a plan and concludes with “We have a plan
on the way forward for public health, and it involves not just doctors and nurses, but all
of us as citizens and stakeholders… Mr. Speaker, we have financing to support this plan.
This is not just talk, this is action” (Tufton 2019, 19). It is important to note that this
speech occurred a full decade after the IMFSP began in 2009. The choice of words
implies that in the past plans were made but financing was unavailable, therefore it is a
true feat to have it now. Is this because the IMF debt burden has lessened? Is this a
healthy sign that the austerity was painful in the short term by beneficial in the long run?
The answers to these questions are not yet clear.
The second area of capacity is in human capital, that is the staffing of qualified
healthcare professionals at all levels. The WHO points out that a “high percentage of
posts (nurses, doctors and allied health care workers) are not filled in the Ministry of
Health which impacts on the delivery of quality health care services” (WHO CCS 2010,
26). To explain, as of 1999 there were 9.2 health workers to 10,000 population. By 2009
this number climbed to 12.1 per 10,000. However, the WHO identified minimum density
of 23 health workers per 10,000 population. Likewise, the Joint Learning Initiative,
which is a group of global healthcare leaders, found that the minimum ratio of health
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workers to population is 25 per 10,000 in order to reach 80% coverage of medical needs.
Overall, these facts demonstrate a general capacity limitation of the Jamaican healthcare
system in both physical and human capital.
The burning question is what is causing the staffing shortages? The answer has
been studied but found to be quite complex. There are some issues, which will be
discussed shortly, that cause both an under-employment as well as drives migration of
professionals out of Jamaica. The first issue driving migration and underemployment
results from budgetary shortfalls. The Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica 2014
(ESSJ) (2015) found the following challenges to the healthcare system:
inadequate staffing; unmet supply to the pharmaceutical demands of the
population served; and inadequate budgetary allocations (the actual
expenditure exceeded in all instances the budgetary allocations). This
shortfall impacted the unmet need of the pharmaceutical and laboratory
services and recruitment of critical hospital staff (ESSJ 2015, 23.10).
Likewise, Gail Tomblin Murphey et al. (2016) surveyed healthcare professionals and
complied research which “identified better wages as the most important driver of
migration” (Murphey et al. 2016, 93). They also had a survey respondent explain:
Because we do lose people-and we are mindful of the fact that the
government salary scale has not been competitive-and so whilst we have
people, we have trained some, we have given some scholarships to be
trained, but our retention is not at the level we would want it to be because
people sometimes move to the private sector to earn more money, and they
also move out of the country for the same reason (Murphey et al. 2016, 98).
Bearing in mind that Jamaica has had a severe debt service, it is clear it does have some
sort of impact, though it is unclear to what extent.
The second issue with staffing is not nearly as straightforward but can still be
largely tied to budgetary concerns. The issue in question deals with the working
84

conditions of the public healthcare system. Gail Tomblin Murphy (2016) discovered “The
second highest-ranking reasons for a desire to migrate were related to the quality of
infrastructure within their workplaces and within the country as a whole” (Murphy et al.
2016, 94). Or, as one respondent to the study explained:
What affects migration are the conditions at work. Money is a big thing, but
your setting is also important - so the conditions at work, in your
environment and so on. This is a big thing that is driving migration… and,
in terms of external, from developing to developed countries, because the
conditions are such that you can get what you want to use and you don’t
have to be fighting to compromise (Murphy et al. 2016, 94).
Overall, what is seen here is that the budgetary needs for supplies are not adequate for the
demand, and that puts a strain on the work environment, which drives staff away. This
issue was also documented by the Jamaican Observer on January 04, 2015, where a
confidential source who explains:
on a number of occasions surgeries have had to be cancelled or postponed
because of a shortage of equipment and the malfunctioning of others… I
think either the Government has no money or the hospitals aren't getting
what they're supposed to get, because basic things like hand towels and
tubes for basic blood tests are hardly or never here (“Doctors Blame Lack
of Resources for Poor Health Care”).
This sentiment is also felt by Chris Tufton (2019) as he explained “The provision of
public health care is also challenged by a limping infrastructure, with no major hospital
expansion or new development in 20 years, and limited maintenance of the facilities we
currently use, leading to constant downtime” (Tufton 2019, 4). Altogether, the budget
causing lower wages and shortages of staff and supplies have led to an unpleasant
workplace, which has led to high levels of migration and further shortages.
The last aspect to consider is that of utilization. According to Shiyan Chao (2013)
“All population quintiles have benefited from the abolition of user fees, particularly the
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poor in 2008… The poorest population shows a 10 percent increase in health care facility
visits, and the richest a 9 percent increase” (Chao 2013, 17). This trend of increase has
continued to present day. In fact, Chris Tufton explains “in 2018 we had 2,879,288 visits
to public health facilities compared to 2,517,330 in 2017” (Tufton 2019, 4). This is
approximately a 14.4 percent increase year over year. As with the initial increase, the
utilization is fairly even across the income spectrum. However, the equal access has
created a burden on the infrastructure and financing of healthcare as many who can afford
health insurance and private healthcare are still turning to the free public system. As
Tufton (2019) explains “persons who have private health insurance and use the public
health system, as some do, without using their cards, are subsidizing private insurance
providers at the expense of the public health system and the tax payer” (Tufton 2019, 7).
It is also important to note that due to the high demand, and consequent long wait
times, many Jamaicans of all social strata are turning to private healthcare when
financially feasible. This is illustrated through Jamaica’s high out of pocket spending.
Specifically, as the MOH Green Paper on National Health Insurance Plan for Jamaica
explains:
Out-of-Pocket (OOP) spending in health represents 28% of the total
expenditure in health. Although this has been decreasing over the last two
decades, it is still at relatively high levels. International experience has
shown that when OOP expenditure is above 20%, families are at a greater
risk of catastrophic health spending and impoverishment because of an
episode of illness (MOH 2019, 5).
Put another way, according to the WHO (2017) “Private expenditure on health as a
percentage of total expenditure on health (2014) [is] 47.62 [%]” (WHO 2017, 1).
Altogether, the ripple effect of the abolishment of user fees has been an increase of
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healthcare for both the public and private sectors. The later increasing as a result of the
former’s noted infrastructure/staff shortcomings.

Non-Communicable Disease
The largest health concern facing Jamaica is that of non-communicable diseases,
as evidenced by the WHO estimate of 70% or mortality coming from non-communicable
diseases (WHO CCS Brief 2018, 1). According to the PAHO (2018):
investing in the prevention and control of NCDs would support the
Government of Jamaica to avoid significant direct costs and indirect
economic losses. Over the period 2017 to 2032, scaling up the
recommended package of interventions would at a minimum:
• Save over 5,700 lives and restore over 67,400 healthy life years
• Avoid labor productivity losses of over 47.3 billion Jamaican dollars
(JMD)
• Save over 29.8 billion JMD of direct medical costs to treat diseases
• Grow GDP by an extra 0.11 percentage points by year five alone
(PAHO/WHO/UN 2018, 1).
That same report furthers that of the myriad of non-communicable diseases, the four
largest for Jamaica are Cardiovascular Disease, Diabetes, Chronic Respiratory Disease,
and Cancer. These NCDs are a financial burden as “Jamaica spends about 15% its health
budget on the four main NCDs” (PAHO/WHO/UN 2018, 2). Therefore, this is an area
that needs directed attention to ensure the health of the island.
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Table 3: Non-Communicable Disease Progress
NCD

2001

2008 percentage

2017 percentage

Percentage
Hypertension

20.9

25.2

31.5

Diabetes

7.2

7.9

10.2

Obesity

19.7

25.3

28.9

Overweight

45.7

51.8

53.9

Table 1 highlights the directional trend in three of the main NCDs troubling
Jamaica. As Table 1 illustrates, the NCD issue in Jamaica is still an increasing problem
for the country. In each of the categories measured Jamaica has demonstrated a
worsening of the health outcome. The deepening of the issue adds to the stress building in
the Jamaican system.
Lastly, a note on cancers. Multiple publications list cancer as a top issue facing
not only Jamaica, but the world at large. However, whether by short coming of the data
systems or the nature of the broad term, there is very little data on overall cancer trends in
Jamaica. Jamaica did create a National Cancer Registry in 2018. The hope is to collect
more data on the types and severities of cancers facing the island. In the future, statistics
on cancer should be readily available, however they have not been at the time of this
writing.

88

Education

This section of the paper has three main goals. First, it is important to look at
relevant literature to understand why education is important in terms of development.
Specifically, the goal is to understand if there is a link to developments in education and
that of economic activity, and thereby economic growth. Second goal is to explain the
design and functionality of the Jamaican education system. The third goal is to determine
if the IMFSP’s demand side policies have had an impact on education outcomes, and if so
to what extent. In other words, have the demand side policies required by the IMFSP
interfered with the supply side consideration of education? It is important to note that
even though the recession began in 2008, the education overhaul via the IMF and WB
partnership did not take effect until 2009. Therefore, this section will utilize 2009 as the
delineating mark.

Education and Development:

An overt assumption of this paper is that education is a vital and crucial element
of economic development. This section aims to test this assumption via a review of
salient literature on the matter. Specifically, the assumption will be tested by verifying if
there is a link between education and economic growth. If there is, what is the extent, or
magnitude, of this correlation? If not, what is the reason why? In sum, the question at
hand is quite clear: does education have an effect on economic development? According
to the literature, the answer is a very muddled “it can.” Though, this is exactly what
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should be expected as the base form of the question does not provide ample space for the
nuanced qualitative questioning and reasoning. Therefore, the seemingly conflicting
results on education will be justified and clarified as part of the process.
As mentioned earlier, the literature on education and GDP shows both a link and a
lack of a link. The first perspective to review is that which does not show a link in
education and economic growth. In his study, Mpho Bosupeng (2015) found “that for
Botswana scenario, there exists no statistically significant relationship between GDP and
expenditure on education and skills development” (Bosupeng 2015, 94). Likewise,
Lanfang Deng and Yulong Zhao (2018) also explained in their study, “human capital
accumulation through education level and cognitive skill has no significant impact on
economic growth” (Deng and Zhao 2018, 1445). Also, in Bahar Bayraktar-Sag˘lam’s
(2017) study, it was determined that “for low and lower middle-income countries,
findings of our paper offer no link between education and economic growth” (BayraktarSag˘lam 2017, 249). In reviewing the results from the above research, it may seem like
education expenditure is a misallocation of resources in terms of economic development.
However, there is more here then meets the eye.
On the opposite side, there is research that has shown positive links to education
and economic development. For instance, when Oscar de J. Gálvez-Soriano (2020)
observed the Mexican experience with education he found “increases in educational
attainment account for nearly one third of real GDP per worker…. a rise of one percent in
years of schooling causes an increase of the long run GDP growth rate of 2.19 percent”
(Gálvez-Soriano 2020, 41, 55). Another great source is Carlota Perez (2017). In her
research comparing the Asian and Latin American development experience, she
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explained “Yet the key to the Asian success was their huge effort in training and
education and the process of intensive technological learning” (Perez 2017, 361). Chapter
3 of this paper agrees with this assessment. Specifically, that the education emphasis in
Singapore played a large role in its economic development. Lastly, returning to Lanfang
Deng and Yulong Zhao (2018) it was determined that “These results suggest that the
population receiving higher education directly bears on the economic growth, and the
impact is a linear positive one” (Deng and Zhao 2018, 1448). Altogether, what the
research does here is illustrate the fact that there are qualifiers to education’s success at
increasing economic growth.
If the research is, in fact, not actually schizophrenic on education and
development then what can be gleaned from it? The short is answer, a great deal is
learned from this research. Specifically, the lesson is that education in, and of, itself is not
a panacea for growth. Instead, there are qualifications and factors to consider which drive
success. To start, Oscar de J. Gálvez-Soriano (2020) explains “improvements in the
quality of education are more important than the expansion of education itself” (GálvezSoriano 2020, 41). This notion is congruent with Mpho Bosupeng’s (2015) study on
Botswana, where he determined “the quality of the education itself should not be
sidelined also. If the quality of the education is very low, it is reasonable to expect low
returns to national output in consequence” (Bosupeng 2015, 94). Additionally, Aleš
Kocourek and Iva Nedomlelová (2018) found “The human capital stock is significantly
determined by the quality and duration of education…The decisive factor in the process
seems to be not only the length of education but also its quality” (Kocourek and

91

Nedomlelová 2018, 2103 & 2112). This sentiment is echoed again by Dan Levy and Jim
Ohls (2010), where they explain:
increasing attendance to school and health centres is simply not enough by
itself to substantially improve longer-term outcomes…. improvements in
the infrastructure of schools and health centres or in the quality of services
provided in education and health are needed for increased attendance to
translate into improved long-term outcomes (Levy and Ohls 2010, 439).
Therefore, the first lesson is that simply getting children to attend school is not enough.
The school must have a high quality of education and effective means of delivering that
education.
The second point the research makes is that what is being taught is also critical to
success. Turning back to Mpho Bosupeng’s (2015) study, he found:
that even though the governments are spending so much money on the
education system, there might be a mismatch between what the employer
needs and the skills possessed by the students… Governments will have to
look at several factors such as the business cycle, diversity of workforce, to
forecast long term economic growth (Bosupeng 2015, 94).
This is a clear echo from what is seen in the Singapore case in chapter 3. As W.G.
Huff (1999) explained, Singapore desired “to avoid the mistakes which nearly all
developing countries are now making -over producing unemployable numbers of
educated white collar workers and not turning out the skilled artisans and technicians we
need for industrial growth” (Huff 1999, 41). Carlota Perez (2017) furthers, “training and
educational policy would need to shift from a quantitative effort to a much more complex
and “mission-oriented” endeavor, with intense collaboration between the public and
private sectors” (Perez 2017, 383).
The third lesson is that current level of economic development also is an
important factor in terms of education success and GDP growth. Bahar Bayraktar92

Sag˘lam (2017) explains “one needs to understand the intricate relationship among
health, education, and economic growth … The endogenous interaction among these
three variables plays a significant role in building up economic and social development
patterns in developing countries” (Bayraktar-Sag˘lam 2017, 232). His thesis is that
sustainable growth is achieved when human capital development is approached
holistically. Therefore, health and education must be developed in conjunction with one
another. In his conclusion, Bahar Bayraktar-Sag˘lam (2017) found:
In particular, econometric results for low-income countries reveal that
health drives economic growth but education has no impact on health and
economic growth. In lower middle-income countries, the empirical findings
highlight that education leads to better health, and better health generates
economic growth. Even though the direct impact of education on growth is
not observed, the indirect effect of education on growth takes place through
better health. The results for higher middle-income countries suggest that
the basic components of human capital (both health and education) have
predictive power for economic growth. In addition, a strong predictive
pattern between health and education exists. Investments in health and
education have both direct and indirect effects on economic growth
(Bayraktar-Sag˘lam 2017, 251).
In other words, Bahar is explaining that health and education are intertwined and equally
required for economic development. His research explains that which is more important
depends on the level of development. In the lower levels, health is the primary driving
force while education plays a supporting role. As development increases health reaches a
certain point where it becomes the supporting actor and education rises to prominence.
This research is crucial for understanding why some papers demonstrate a lack of
correlation between education and GDP growth while other papers do find a significant
link.
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Overall, the literature reviewed paints a clear picture that education is important
for economic development. However, there is a strong caveat. Education for the sake of
education accomplishing little. Education must be of a high quality and intentionally
directed towards economic success. As Carlota Perez (2017) aptly explains, “If there is a
single timeless lesson that can be learned from the success of the Four Asian Tigers, it is
their emphasis on learning, both internal (within companies) and external (in public and
private education and training systems)” (Perez 2017, 383). The Tigers were deliberate in
choosing to pave their own path forward, rather than follow the established path. This
paved dividends to their development as they were able to meet the unique demands of
innovative corporations, thereby creating the favorable conditions needed to flourish in
the global economy. Whether direct or indirect, high quality education does have a
positive correlation with economic development.

A brief history of Jamaican education system and its design
In order to understand Jamaica’s development of education, its heritage of slavery
and status as an English colony. Prior to emancipation, education was reserved for white
men, who either hired tutors or sent their children to boarding schools in England. After
emancipation, the English sought to integrate former slaves into society and developed
basic education. This basic education came mostly from missionaries to the islands and
was therefore heavily influenced by the church. This system lasted until 1953 when the
provincial government in Jamaica assumed responsibility through the creation of the
Ministry of Education (MOE) (Zerrick 2018). Approximately a decade later, in the
1960s, Jamaica created an educational system which is still in use today. Then, in the
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1970s, Jamaica joined a movement in the Caribbean to standardize education by joining
the newly introduced Caribbean Examinations Council (CXC). The CXC provides
education standards for the entire Caribbean. Next, in 1982, Jamaica created the Human
Employment and Resources Training Trust (HEART), which gave students access to
vocational education at international standards.
According to the MOE, Jamaica’s system is broken down into four levels. The
levels are Early Childhood (ages 3-5, pre-school – kindergarten), Primary (ages 6-11,
grades 1-6), Secondary (12-19, grades 7-13), and Tertiary (ages 19+, college education)
(MOE 2013, 3). Furthermore, the MOE breaks the secondary level into two cycles:
The first cycle, is for three years (grades 7 to 9) of Secondary schools and
All Age, Primary & Junior High and Agricultural High. The second cycle
is provided for two years in grades 10 and 11 for students 15 to 16 years
old. Some institutions offer a further two years at grades 12 and 13. Five
years of secondary education is offered in Secondary High and some
Technical High schools. Jamaica has achieved universal enrollment in
grades one through nine (WB 2015, 1).
The MOE is also trying to increase enrollment beyond grade nine. In 2007 the enrolment
rate for secondary education was 78% (WB 2009, 1).
From its inception until 2009, the education system as solely managed by the
centralized MOE. However, in 2009 a new program was commissioned, named the
Education System Transformation Program (ESTP). Under the ESTP, Jamaica’s system
was broken down into decentralized groups which monitor and equip each region. The
specific groups include:
-

National Education Inspectorate (NEI): to inspect and monitor for results
National Education Trust (NET): to create private and public partnerships to fund
education and drive greater utilization
Jamaican Teaching Counsel (JTC): to provide training and resources to teachers
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Additionally, when the MOE was first decentralized it was broken into four Regional
Education Authorities (REA). These REA were to govern the education system of their
regions in hopes that they could better target regional education needs. However, the
REAs were found to be inefficient, and they created duplications in costs as each REA
had its own management team. This also discouraged the sharing of costs and
information. To streamline the system, the REAs were rolled up into a single department,
the Department of School Services (DSS). This allowed for management and costs to
become efficient once again.

Pre-2009 Funding and Outcomes
Access to education has been a persistent issue for Jamaica. In 1957 Jamaica
introduced the Common Entrance Examine, which “heralded a system of meritocracy
which allowed students to gain entrance to secondary education based on their academic
ability rather than the social and financial capabilities of their parents or guardians”
(Hutton 2014, 3). However, budgetary concerns did not allow for the continuance of the
government scholarship program which allowed for children from the poorer classes to
attend secondary education. Therefore, in 1994 Jamaica introduced a Cost Sharing
system “whereby parents were required to pay tuition fees as a portion of the cost”
(Hutton 2014, 7). Under this plan a sliding scale for cost sharing was utilized to create an
equitable system across socio-economic strata. This policy remained in effect until 2007,
when the new government administration removed secondary level tuition. The goal was
to drive enrollment in the lower economic strata.
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As mentioned above, Jamacia had instituted a cost sharing program, which it
abolished in 2007, that was designed to assist with paying for the education. Though it
was on a sliding scale, the lower end of this scale still had issues with school attendance
even when exempted form cost sharing. Therefore, Jamaica implemental a Conditional
Cash Transfer (CCT) program called the Program of Advancement Through Health and
Education (PATH), which is still in effect today. According to Dan Levy and Jim Ohls
(2010)
PATH is organised around two components: child assistance grants, which
provide health and education grants for eligible poor children through age
17, conditional on children through age six visiting a health clinic every two
months during the first year and twice per year thereafter, and children ages
six to 17 attending at least 85 per cent of school days; and social assistance
grants, which provide grants to poor pregnant or lactating mothers, elderly
poor (over age 65), and poor, disabled, and destitute adults under age 65
(Levy and Ohls 2010, 423).
The goal of this program is to remove the barriers that would prevent the poor from
getting the healthcare and education needed to succeed and grow. As Dan Levy and Jim
Ohls (2010) explain. “CCTs have been found to produce significant positive effects on
the use of both education and health services in many countries” (Levy and Ohls 2010,
421).
As for the success of the program, in terms of education, Marco Stampini, Sofia
Martinez-Cordova, Sebastian Insfran, Donna Harris (2016) found
We find consistent evidence that participation in Jamaica’s CCT program
places urban boys on a higher educational trajectory by significantly
increasing their GSAT scores and the quality of the secondary school in
which they are placed …We only find impacts for boys. Although we have
no means to test the hypothesis, this gender dimension of the results may be
explained by (and is consistent with) the fact that girls exhibit higher levels
of pre-treatment school performance (lower dropout, higher academic
achievement) (Stampini et al. 2016, 15).
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In the Stamipini et al. research a positive correlation between male educational outcomes
was well defined and statistically significant. Likewise, Dan Levy and Jim Ohls (2010)
found that “Our results suggest that PATH has increased school attendance by
approximately 0.5 days per month. The estimated increase is about 3 per cent over the
baseline level, and it is statistically significant” (Levy and Ohls 2010, 438). Both sources
show that the CCT program implemented in Jamaica achieved its aim at increasing
utilization. However, as mentioned earlier, quality of education is still important and
increasing utilization does not address quality issues. Therefore, it is important to
mention that Dan Levy and Jim Ohls (2010) also explained “While PATH was successful
at increasing school attendance and preventive health visits, there is no evidence that it
was able to affect longer-term outcomes such as marks in school, advancement to next
grade, or healthcare status” (Levy and Ohls 2010, 439). For this reason, further reforms
and assistance did, and does need to be addressed.
In addition to assisting the poor obtain services, PATH has had a secondary
benefit to the Jamaican government as well. Specifically, “Before the development of
PATH, the Government of Jamaica financed 54 safety net programmes through 12
ministries. This was generally perceived to be an ineffective way of delivering social
assistance” (Levy and Ohls 2010, 423). With the development of PATH Jamaica was
able to streamline their assistance programs and drive precious cost savings efficiency
into safety net system.
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Outcomes:

In the funding application for the WB loan, the education statistics revealed the
following:
The 2009 Grade 4 Literacy Test showed that 30 percent of 4th grade
students had not achieved mastery at their grade level. The National Grade
Nine Achievement Test (GNAT) scores for 2009 reveal low student
performance in English language (51.5%) and math (43.9%)'. The
percentage of Grade 11 cohort in public schools passing the Caribbean
Secondary Education Certificate (CSEC), administered by the Caribbean
Examinations Council (CXC), has only increased in English language from
28.5 percent in 2001 to 35.4 percent in 2009 and in math from 16.6 percent
to 19.8 percent. (2009, 1).
Therefore, prior to the ESTP, the Jamaican education system has proven to have poor
education results. This illustrates Jamaica’s need to address education on a systemic
level.

Post-2009 Funding and Outcomes
In 2009, Jamaica approached the WB for assistance in funding their education
system overall, the ESTP. The WB’s role in the ESTP was to provide US$16 million in
loans over a three-year period. The plan objective “is to build the capacity of the key
agencies established to support the national Education System Transformation
Programme (ESTP)” (WB 2015, 2). Specifically, the plan required that the system be
decentralized into regional authorities and create national monitoring of the regional
authorities through the National Education Trust (NET) and National Education
Inspectorate (NEI), as well as training mechanisms to better equip teachers. It is
important to note that the WB expenditure was specific not to education outcomes
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directly, “but should address issues which contribute to those factors which are directly
related to students’ performance” (Hutton 2014, 17). The funding from the WB, though it
would not directly support education results in the classroom, it would free up valuable
resources to make stronger outcomes possible. In other words, the WB loan was specific
to reorganization of the MOE by providing a portion of the funds needed to pay for the
reorganization efforts of the educational system.
In conjunction with the WB, the Inter Development Bank (IDB) also offered
funds for the educational overhaul. For its part, the IDB supported the ESTP through
school infrastructure, the development of curriculum, and building of facilities. In terms
of facilities, the IDB provided funds for “the construction of a limited number of
secondary schools in areas where access is either non-existent or limited, or where
schools operate in double shifts” (IDB 2009, 3). Overall, the goal of the IDB is to provide
both additional access and higher quality of education.
One area where the need is evident is with school enrolment. With the removal of
cost sharing tuition fees in 2007, Jamaica expected to see a large spike in enrolment rates.
The result was “The net enrolment rate (NER) increased by 3.6 percentage points
between 2007-8 and 2010-11” (Hutton 2014, 8). However, this was below the increase
expected. The figure below, provided by the MOE, illustrates the lackluster enrollment
rates post removal of cost sharing.
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Figure 9: Total Students Enrolled in the Public Education System 2007-2016
It is important to note that there is a reason for the lackluster enrollment.
Specifically, it is attributed to the fact that reality does not always follow policy. Hutton
explains “even though tuition fees have been removed as a result of the policy of the JLP
government, secondary schools continue to obtain financial support through auxiliary
fees and other contributions paid by the parents,” and at “the household level, 5.1 per cent
of household expenditure goes on education” (Hutton 2014, 13-14). Furthermore, a
survey of teachers found:
Twenty teachers mentioned how the lack of resources impacted
implementation. T5 explained that Jamaica is constantly seeking external
funding. She insisted that after the first phase of a policy, the government is
usually unable to sustain it financially. T11 observed that sometimes
teachers are provided with resources. But T8 declared that they were never
given enough. So teachers spent their own money, did fundraising, or made
their own materials. T12 stated that although the ministry insisted that
teachers acquire certain materials that were to be used in the classroom, that
those materials were not available. (Chunnu-Brayda, 2012, 37-38).
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In other words, the educators surveyed explained that they saw a disconnect from
programs enacted and programs executed. The GOJ often promised to provide resources,
but rarely did and under provided when funds were given.
An important factor to understand in terms of promised funding versus provided
funding is where the IMF fits into the picture. Though the IMF does not directly require
reductions in the education budget, its involvement in the Jamaican budget has a net
reduction affect. Specifically, under the IMF austerity and debt reduction policy Jamaica
is prevented from taking on any new debt. This is problematic for the MOE, as the ESTP
was largely funded by loans from the WB and IDB. The WB explains situation:
While NET was slated to engage in PPP [Public Private Partnerships]
procurement to finance school infrastructure, MoFP [Ministry of Finance
and Planning] asserted that this was no longer possible because it would be
considered as new debt. Thus, until GOJ’s debt is under control, NET’s PPP
activities are limited to the mobilization of private support (grants or inkind) to meet schools’ infrastructure and material needs. . . In short, under
an IMF program launched in 2013, GOJ committed to the reduction of its
heavy debt, including refraining from incurring any new debt. This
impacted Project disbursements, which were curtailed by strict budget
ceilings established for each sector. The IMF program also limited NET’s
activities (World Bank Completion Report 2015, 5).
Hutton furthered that the budget increase for education from 13% to 15% never occurred
because of the IMFSP’s no new debt policy which effective acts as a budget constraint
(Hutton 2014, 10). Therefore, the Jamaica education remains under funded and net
enrollment in secondary education remains sub-par. The figures below illustrate where
the education budget is at, and where the funds are allocated.
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Outcomes:

In terms of educational outcomes, the MOE official statists listed progress in the
key indicators. First, for the Grade 4 Literacy test, there was a marked increase from 70%
presenting mastery in 2009 to 80% having mastery in 2017. For the Grade 9
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Achievement Test, the results were mixed. The Language Arts mean score increased
from the 2009 baseline of 51.5 to 54 in 2017. However, the mean score on mathematics
saw a decrease during this time period from 43.9 to 28. For the Caribbean Secondary
Education Certificate, the scores saw remarkable increases from the 2009 baseline.
Mathematics saw an increase from 19.8 to 41 and Language Arts saw an increase from
35.4 to 65.7. Overall, these results are mixed. There seems to be an increase in quality in
education from the JTC and NEI. However, the budgetary constraints and access issues
are showing in the secondary levels. Specifically, for those that stay through grade 11,
their education results have marked improvement, but the number of students who stay
through are not increasing at the needed pace.
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Chapter Five: Concluding Discussion

From the outset, this paper was concerned with the efficacy of IMFSP’s strategies
under the Great Consensus. The main concern was that the approach used was not
sufficient to solve the puzzle of sustained growth and development. Though the question
is larger than this paper can address, the hope was to at least provide enough insight via a
case study of Jamaica as it has experienced the full weight of the IMF policy
recommendations over its life. Specifically, Jamaica was a natural fit because it has been
under constant IMF programs almost since its independence. This detail provided the
breath needed to look at this question with some real longevity which provides
substantial weight to the analysis, especially as the IMF changed policy ideologies over
this period as well. Additionally, this paper contrasted the neoliberal demand side policies
of the IMF with the developmentalist supply side approach of Singapore. These two
countries both gained independence from the British around the same time yet had very
different outcomes. Therefore, the contrast between these two approaches provides both
meaningful analysis and suggestions for a new path forward for Jamaica.
Before diving into any suggestions, it is important to summarize the IMFSP and
how it has impacted Jamaica’s growth. While researching the history of the IMF and its
structural adjustment programs, it was made clear that the original goal of the IMF was
short-term issues of exchange rate stabilization. This foundation colored the way the IMF
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approached countries as issues countries faced were clear and short term. Later, the IMF
moved to a much more complicated goal of stabilizing the system of exchange itself.
Though this was only a very slight shift in language, the shift in ideology from it was
quite large. With this shift, the IMF moved from looking only to triage a currency
exchange issue to trying to cure the foundational reasons for the currency issue. The
problem with this change is the IMF may have changed targets more than ideology. That
is, the IMF may tend to be shortsighted and focus so much on stabilization that long term
success factors may be ignored. In other words, the IMF’s focus on demand side policies
demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice supply side considerations like long term success
in education and healthcare. This is done through austere programs that focus on not only
ending deficits but allow room for repayment of IMF loans.
As demonstrated earlier, fiscal space is important to recovery during economic
downturns. By prioritizing repayment in the current term, this may be utilizing too much
fiscal space, thereby possibly preventing long term success. This is evidenced in both the
healthcare and education sectors as a common issue in their systems is a lack of
financing. The question is are these financing issues caused, exacerbated, or lessened by
the IMFSP? The thought leading into this analysis was a resounding yes, but did that
hold? Well, no. It has proved to be more complicated than expected as Jamaica made a
lot of policy changes both with guidance from the IMF and completely independent of it
to hit its own major goals set decades prior.
Taking healthcare, for instance, it clear that the desire to make healthcare
affordable and universal to the island has increased both the demand and cost. Would
Jamaica have been able to fund its plan if IMF did not step in? Perhaps, perhaps not, it is
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difficult to say with certainty. Does the IMFSP, instead, create an environment of
austerity and cost cutting that makes larger investments into healthcare exceedingly
difficult? It can be argued that the answer is yes. There were no direct cuts to healthcare
like other entities endured. However, there were both indirect cuts and slow down, at the
very least, in the speed at which necessary development funds were acquired for health
care. Further research is required to quantify the true nature and effect the IMFSP had on
the development of healthcare, which will determine if the benefits outweigh the costs, or
vice versa.
Turning the attention to Education, the picture is clearer on the effects of the
IMFSP. First, the research made it clear that Jamaica’s emphasis on education kept it
largely insulated from budget cuts prior to the IMFSP. However, after the implementation
the protection from cuts was no longer there. As stated by the WB (2015), “In the
Project’s later years GoJ’s ceiling on the education budget, precipitated by fiscal
constraints and the 2013-17 IMF program to reduce debt, slowed disbursements” (World
Bank Completion Report 2015, 9). Therefore, the IMFSP did have a negative impact on
the NET’s ability to drive the development of education forward.
Overall, when looking at the history of the IMF, Jamaica, and Jamaica’s human
capital development, a trend does emerge. During the latest round of IMFSP, 2008 to
present, Jamaica’s economy has stabilized as promised. For over a decade Jamacia
tightened its belt and made economically and politically difficult decisions. The country
that faced the global pandemic, and its recession, is very different from the country that
faced the Great Recession. Jamaica is in a stronger place, economically, than it was in
2008. With that said, a secondary trend has emerged as well. Specifically, while
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Jamaica’s economy has stabilized there has been a stunting in the growth of healthcare
and education. This stunt may prove to have a negative impact going forward. The forced
austerity and budget cuts may have been needed to divest the government from areas of
non-essential business so that it can now focus on core competencies like human capital
development. However, the lost decade may stifle growth for some time. This situation
illustrates a point made by Alfred Maizels (1994), “aid is usually subject to restrictive
conditions, both as to its use and, increasingly, as to domestic economic and political
policies, which may reduce the efficiency of aid in relation to other means of financing
development” (Maizels 1994, 1689).
In direct contrast the IMFSP in Jamaica, Singapore took a very different path to
development and the rise of Singapore as a nation was an interesting case. It stayed
authoritarian, rather than democratizing. This typically leads to lower growth. However,
the government had a different perspective. It saw its role as one to drive growth at all
costs. It started off with import substitution, to protect its growing industries. However, it
did not rest there. It then really focused on education and finding ways to compete
internationally. The government created an Economic Development Board that
researched the global trends and then lobbied corporations to bring their manufacturing to
Singapore. It started off with tech in the 1970s, and then turned to biotech and
pharmaceuticals. Singapore also moved into various services like accounting and finance.
The goals of the government have stressed making the population competitive through
increases in human capital, while attracting opportunities for that capital to thrive. It is
also interesting to note that the government has always done everything it could to move
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the country forward. This even includes investing the national reserves. This philosophy
took Singapore from a developing economy to a first class one in one generation.
The logical question is what can the IMF and Jamaica learn from the Singaporean
case? As a reminder, Carlota Perez explained that Latin America cannot follow the exact
same footsteps as the Asian countries, like Singapore. She explains that development is a
moving target that require both concerted attention to domestic resources as well as
technological revolutions. Specifically, she explains “The specific nature of each
technological revolution and the successive windows of opportunity that it opens mean
that development possibilities are a moving target—and that development strategies are
therefore temporary and must be updated and redesigned accordingly” (Perez 2017, 356).
Her point here is crucial for the IMF to understand how to move forward. The IMF
measures take a one size fits all approach to development, rather than helping countries to
find new ways to approach their development. Carlota Perez (2017) provides a
perspective on this:
The lack of such progress is the Achilles heel of any strategy in Latin
America …if natural resources are to lead to development, they will have
to encompass a very wide network of participants and activities, all with an
innovative approach. Without a strong shift toward science and engineering
in the educational system and without intense and persistent learning efforts
on the part of companies and the public sector, success is simply not
possible, whatever the strategy (Perez 2017, 368).
In sum, the IMF’s approach has proven to have merit as a short-term stabilization
tool. However, the model used for stabilization does not provide the necessary framework
for sustained long term growth. As Ha-Joon Chang explains:
the policy-related conditionalities attached to financial assistance from the
IMF and the World Bank or from the donor governments should be radically
changed. These conditionalities should be based on the recognition that
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many of the policies that are considered “bad” are in fact not so, and that
there can be no universal “best practice” policy that everyone should use
(Chang 2003, 29).
Instead, the IMF should look to countries like Singapore that have found ways to
successfully utilize out of the box approaches to development. The path forward is not
found in the exact steps Singapore took, but rather the mentality to find innovative ways
to be efficient and competitive in global markets. Jamaica, being a resource rich country,
will need to find a path forward which includes its natural resources, its supply of
educated and healthy human capital, and a niche to become the central hub for. By
embracing the “bad” industrial policy Jamaica will be able to create a supply of capital
worthy of global demand, thereby attracting useful FDI and creating sustainable longterm economic growth.
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